Auditor Choice under Client Information Uncertainty

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Title:	Auditor Choice under Client Information Uncertainty
Authors:	Chang, Chien-Heng Jennifer;Chou, Ling-Tai Lynette
Contributors:	淡江大學會計學系
Keywords:	auditor choice;information uncertainty;auditor expertise
Date:	2013-08-06
Issue Date:	2014-10-28 16:48:33 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	This paper examines the auditors chosen by companies whose financial statements with information uncertainty and infers that these companies may choose specialist auditors to signal the credibility of the financial statements and improve market perception. We develop comprehensive measurements of information uncertainty from the auditor’s point of view and further disentangle the information uncertainty effects into fundamental volatility uncertainty and information quality uncertainty. We use an auditor switching sample of U.S. companies from 2001-2009 to examine whether the information uncertainty is an issue of auditor choice or not. Consistent with our conjecture, companies under information uncertainty prefer to hire specialist auditors. Evidence partially supports that, relative to companies under fundamental volatility uncertainty, companies suffering information quality uncertainty are more inclined to choose specialist auditors.
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute & Department of Accounting] Proceeding

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