Government bailouts and default risks of a duopoly: strong bank versus weak bank

doi:10.1080/00036846.2014.932048

淡江大學機構典藏 > 商管學院 > 國際企業學系暨研究所 > 期刊論文 > Item 987654321/99020

請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/99020

題名:	Government bailouts and default risks of a duopoly: strong bank versus weak bank
作者:	Tsai, Jeng-Yan;Lin, Jyh-Horng;Cheng, Chu-Yun
貢獻者:	淡江大學國際企業學系
關鍵詞:	bank interest margin;default risk;distressed asset purchases;direct equity injections;duopoly;G21;G28
日期:	2014-09-18
上傳時間:	2014-10-09 10:26:48 (UTC+8)
出版者:	Abingdon: Routledge
摘要:	A duopolistic loan market includes a strong bank without the problem of early closure that opts out of government bailouts and a weak bank with this problem that participates in the bailout programmes of distressed loan purchases and direct equity injections. A direct implication of our framework is that the strong bank’s equity will be priced as a standard call option, while the weak bank’s equity will be priced as a down-and-out call option. We find that an increase in either bailout (i.e. distressed loan purchases and direct equity injections) directly decreases the weak bank’s default risk but indirectly increases the strong bank’s default risk. Accordingly, either bailout contributes to banking stability since the indirect positive effect insufficiently offsets the direct negative effect, giving an overall negative response of default risks to an increase in either bailout. Higher competition by shifting to quasi-competition from collusion increases banking stability under either bailout. Our analysis suggests that competition is aligned with the regulatory objective of improving stability.
關聯:	Applied Economics 46(34), pp.4137-4150
DOI:	10.1080/00036846.2014.932048
顯示於類別:	[國際企業學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

文件中的檔案:

檔案	描述	大小	格式	瀏覽次數
Government bailouts and default risks of a duopoly strong bank versus weak bank.pdf		382Kb	Adobe PDF	1	檢視/開啟
index.html		0Kb	HTML	307	檢視/開啟

在機構典藏中所有的資料項目都受到原著作權保護.

TAIR相關文章

資料載入中.....