Anti-dumping Policy and Product R&D

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Title:	Anti-dumping Policy and Product R&D
Authors:	高國峯;彭正浩
Contributors:	淡江大學產業經濟學系
Keywords:	Anti-dumping Policy;Product R&D;Retaliation;Withdraw
Date:	2014-06-28
Issue Date:	2014-09-24 12:30:22 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	We analyze firms’ incentive to invest in product R&D and how this product R&D affects firms’ incentive to petition for an antidumping protection. It is found that, when one of the governments implements antidumping policy, the protected firm decreases its product R&D investment while the constrained firm invests more. The total product R&D investment is even lower than that under free trade, which in turn may deteriorate the profit of protected firm. Accordingly, the protected firm may withdraw its anti-dumping petition. Moreover, we show that the constrained firm has the incentive to petition for a fight-back anti-dumping policy only if the level of product R&D can be endogenously determined. Finally, such an anti-dumping retaliation increases the incentive of the protected firm to petition for an anti-dumping protection if the level of product R&D is large enough.
Relation:	89th Annual Western Economic Association International Conference
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute & Department of Industrial Economics] Proceeding

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