Compensation System and Earnings Inequality

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題名:	Compensation System and Earnings Inequality
作者:	Jiang, Lily;Yu, Hsi-Cheng
貢獻者:	淡江大學經濟學系
關鍵詞:	Performance pay;Principal-agent theory;Earnings inequality
日期:	2013-01-01
上傳時間:	2014-03-09 22:32:03 (UTC+8)
出版者:	Springer
摘要:	We develop a wage-structure determination model in which a firm with incomplete information offers an optimal sequence of contracts for its heterogeneous employees. The model integrating the principal-agent framework and monitoring mechanism is characterized by endogeneity of the selection of two compensation methods: performance-pay and non-performance-pay schemes. The model is used to examine the switching of pay schemes and its inequality effect. We point out that the growth of performance-pay jobs is accompanied by a downward adjustment of the rewards for performance, which brings forth a countervailing effect on wage inequality. The simulation analysis of a case of uniform-distributed ability reveals that the net effect of the growth of performance-pay jobs on wage inequality depends on the driving force behind the switch.
關聯:	Journal of Economic Inequality 12, pp.99-116
DOI:	10.1007/s10888-012-9239-y
顯示於類別:	[產業經濟學系暨研究所] 期刊論文 [經濟學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

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