淡江大學機構典藏:Item 987654321/96543
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    题名: Compensation System and Earnings Inequality
    作者: Jiang, Lily;Yu, Hsi-Cheng
    贡献者: 淡江大學經濟學系
    关键词: Performance pay;Principal-agent theory;Earnings inequality
    日期: 2013-01-01
    上传时间: 2014-03-09 22:32:03 (UTC+8)
    出版者: Springer
    摘要: We develop a wage-structure determination model in which a firm with incomplete information offers an optimal sequence of contracts for its heterogeneous employees. The model integrating the principal-agent framework and monitoring mechanism is characterized by endogeneity of the selection of two compensation methods: performance-pay and non-performance-pay schemes. The model is used to examine the switching of pay schemes and its inequality effect. We point out that the growth of performance-pay jobs is accompanied by a downward adjustment of the rewards for performance, which brings forth a countervailing effect on wage inequality. The simulation analysis of a case of uniform-distributed ability reveals that the net effect of the growth of performance-pay jobs on wage inequality depends on the driving force behind the switch.
    關聯: Journal of Economic Inequality 12, pp.99-116
    DOI: 10.1007/s10888-012-9239-y
    显示于类别:[產業經濟學系暨研究所] 期刊論文
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