決策者執行方案後，當方案回饋資訊為負面時，決策者是否會因自利動機或顧及自我概念與自我形象而產生承諾續擴，堅持繼續執行甚至投入更多資源於無經濟價值之方案。本研究利用代理問題與自我申辯來探討決策者之承諾續擴行為。本研究以上市上櫃之財務部門經理人員為受試者共87位，進行變異數分析。實證結果發現，代理問題條件對於承諾續擴程度具顯著水準，受試者在有自利動機且資訊不對稱情況下，承諾續擴程度會大於無自利動機或沒有資訊不對稱，但自我申辯條件對於承諾續擴程度未具顯著水準。對於繼續資本支出決策意願之結果指出，自我申辯條件及代理問題條件具顯著交互作用。在其他方析方面，代理問題條件與道德判斷水準對繼續進行方案決策傾向之結果具有顯著交互作用，低道德判斷水準之受試者在有誘因及私有資訊者比未具備者較會傾向持續進行利已但不利於公司之方案。 Managers commonly face the problem of deciding whether to continue committing resources to a risky and highly uncertain project, or possibly personal commitment and reputation, have already been spent. This study examines the effect of agency problem and self-justification on the level of escalation of commitment in investment decisions and interaction between self justification and agency problem. Furthermore discuss interaction between moral reasoning levels and agency problem. Results from 87 listed and OTC firms' financial manager. The findings suggested that agency problem had strong explanatory power for project escalation of commitment. Investment decisions of subjects were analyzed and a significantly interaction was found between agency problem and self justification. While subjects with self justification situation showed a significant stronger tendency to continue a failing project when adverse conditions emerged. The relationship between moral reasoning levels and agency problem can accurately describe the tendency to escalate commitment. While subjects with lower moral reasoning level showed a significant stronger tendency to continue a failing project when adverse conditions emerged.
「2006當代會計暨管理論壇」大會手冊論文集=Proceedings of the 2006 Forum on Contemporary Accounting & Management，25頁