This paper examines whether a relationship exists among superior's budgetary leadership behavior, managerial budgeting games, and attitudes towards the budget. The effects were tested using a structural equation model that processed questionnaire data from 216 managers employed at listed companies in Taiwan. Analytical results reveal that when the superior's behavior is contingent reward, managers will be more likely to play economic games than devious games to obtain their budget requests. However, to cope with the pressure that results from the superior's behavior being contingent punishment, managers are more likely to play devious games than economic games to obtain their budget requests. As we hypothesized, managers who play devious games have negative attitudes towards the budget, while those who play economic games do not. The superior should provide a budgeting environment in which economic games are perceived by subordinate managers as being successful strategies to use when presenting their budget.
2007會計理論與實務研討會論文集=Proceedings of 2007 Accounting Theory and Practice Conference，49頁