English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  全文笔数/总笔数 : 58286/91808 (63%)
造访人次 : 13814079      在线人数 : 43
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library & TKU Library IR team.
搜寻范围 查询小技巧:
  • 您可在西文检索词汇前后加上"双引号",以获取较精准的检索结果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜寻,建议至进阶搜寻限定作者字段,可获得较完整数据
  • 进阶搜寻

    jsp.display-item.identifier=請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/95523

    题名: Spatial Competition and Subcontracting with Price Leadership
    作者: Liang, Wen-Jung;Mai, Chao-Cheng
    贡献者: 淡江大學產業經濟學系
    日期: 2003-12
    上传时间: 2014-02-12 12:33:10 (UTC+8)
    摘要: This paper develops a variant of Hotelling's (1929) model involving subcontracting production as well as price leadership to explore the possibility of the validity of the principle of Minimum Differentiation. It shows that the equilibrium locations are determined by two controversial forces: a centripetal force that is generated from subcontracting production and price leadership for saving transportation costs of the subcontracting input, and a conventional centrifugal force that arises from price competition for reducing market competition. It also demonstrates that when the transport rate of the subcontracted input is sufficiently large relative to that of the final product, the principle of Minimum Differentiation arises, but the principle of Maximum Differentiation occurs if the condition is reversed. Furthermore, the two firms will locate together at the endpoints of the line market where the rival of the Stackelberg leader locates instead of agglomerating at the center of the line market.
    關聯: 2003聯合年會暨論文研討會:全球化的地方挑戰與回應論文集,28頁
    显示于类别:[產業經濟學系暨研究所] 會議論文


    档案 大小格式浏览次数
    Spatial Competition and Subcontracting with Price Leadership_英文摘要.docx17KbMicrosoft Word180检视/开启



    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library & TKU Library IR teams. Copyright ©   - 回馈