Subcontracting and International Trade Policy

機構典藏 > College of Business and Management > Graduate Institute & Department of Industrial Economics > Proceeding > Item 987654321/95518

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/95518

Title:	Subcontracting and International Trade Policy
Authors:	Liang, Wen-Jung;Chen, Ho-Chyuan;Shi, Mau-Shan
Contributors:	淡江大學產業經濟學系
Keywords:	國際代工;最適貿易政策;Nash談判;行銷成本;國際貿易政策;International Subcontracting;Optimal Trade Policy;Nash Bargaining;Marketing Cost;International Trade Policy
Date:	2001-04
Issue Date:	2014-02-12 12:32:33 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	This paper examines the optimal trade policies when internationalsubcontracting occurs between two competing firms. It shows that ifthe comparative advantage effect dominates the cost saving transfereffect, the exporting country will impose a different policy on eachexport. In contrast, if the cost saving transfer effect dominates thecomparative advantage effect, the exporting country will impose a taxpolicy on both exports. However, there never exists an optimal policyto subsidize the export of both subcontracted product and finalproduct. Even though the exporting firm is assumed away its export offinal good, to subsidize the export of the subcontracted good is notnecessarily an optimal policy for the exporting country. For theimporting country, if the price elasticity of demand is sufficientlysmall and the marketing cost of final product is large enough, it isoptimal to set a negative tariff.
Relation:	第五屆經濟發展學術研討會論文集，22頁
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute & Department of Industrial Economics] Proceeding

Files in This Item:

File	Size	Format
Subcontracting and International Trade Policy_英文摘要.docx	17Kb	Microsoft Word	105	View/Open