淡江大學機構典藏:Item 987654321/95503
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  全文笔数/总笔数 : 64178/96951 (66%)
造访人次 : 9385189      在线人数 : 242
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library & TKU Library IR team.
搜寻范围 查询小技巧：
  • 您可在西文检索词汇前后加上"双引号"，以获取较精准的检索结果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜寻，建议至进阶搜寻限定作者字段，可获得较完整数据
    •  进阶搜寻


    jsp.display-item.identifier=請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/95503


    题名: RJV Competition and Financial Structure
    作者: Chen, Ho-Chyuan
    贡献者: 淡江大學產業經濟學系
    关键词: 財務結構;研究發展;Cournot競爭;最適行為;研究合資競爭;Financial Structure;R&D;Cournot Competition;Optimal Behavior;Research Joint Venture Competition
    日期: 2000-06
    上传时间: 2014-02-12 12:30:15 (UTC+8)
    摘要: This paper sets up a three-stage model to analyze firms' optimal behaviors in a RJV. Firms choose the financial structure first, then R&D investment in the RJV, and finally the output level in a Cournot market. Under uncertain cost reduction of R&D, the use of debt commits an aggressive stance---higher R&D effort and output level---but firms may not be better off. Among different structures, the leveraged firm gains the least profit in an asymmetric industry, but gains the most profit in a symmetric leveraged industry. Both using debt and both not using debt are the two subgame perfect equilibria, and both suing debt survives as a focal equilibrium. This is in sharp contrast to the prisoner's dilemma outcome in Brander and Lewis.
    關聯: 產業經濟學國際學術研討會論文集=Proceedings of the 2000 Taipei International Conference on Industrial Economics，頁952-974
    显示于类别:[產業經濟學系暨研究所] 會議論文

    文件中的档案:

    档案 大小格式浏览次数
    RJV Competition and Financial Structure_英文摘要.docx16KbMicrosoft Word147检视/开启

    在機構典藏中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.

    TAIR相关文章

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library & TKU Library IR teams. Copyright ©   - 回馈