English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  全文筆數/總筆數 : 51948/87093 (60%)
造訪人次 : 8506213      線上人數 : 126
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library & TKU Library IR team.
搜尋範圍 查詢小技巧:
  • 您可在西文檢索詞彙前後加上"雙引號",以獲取較精準的檢索結果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜尋,建議至進階搜尋限定作者欄位,可獲得較完整資料
  • 進階搜尋
    請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/95494

    題名: Bribery, Hierarchical Government, and Incomplete Environmental Enforcement
    作者: Hu, Jin-Li;Huang, Chung-Huang
    貢獻者: 淡江大學產業經濟學系
    關鍵詞: 賄賂;貪汙;執行;稅收分配;公共行政;Bribery;Corruption;Enforcement;Revenue-Sharing;Public Administration
    日期: 2001-10
    上傳時間: 2014-02-12 12:29:17 (UTC+8)
    摘要: A three-player model is established in order to examine the effects ofenvironmental policy instruments, budget control, and bribery on thedecision-makings of the local government, the firm, and the centralgovernment. The model incorporates several important factors such as ahierarchical government, a firm's evasive behaviors (includingemission violation, concealment, and bribery), mixed policyinstruments (tax and penalties), and enforcement (effort and quality).An increase in the emission tax rate might result in more taxes beingreported and less tax evasion under incomplete enforcement. Briberycan cause over-enforcement as well as under-enforcement efforts.Bribery might even promote enforcement efforts especially when theenforcer's 'legal' revenues are independent of his enforcementquality. An increase in the local revenue-sharing and tax and penaltyrates will promote the local government's enforcement effort andquality and thus maybe the bribes, too. However, a stricter emissionstandard enhances the enforcement effort and the violation probabilityand thus may lower the quality of enforcement. The distortion(inefficiency) from bribery can be at least partially offset throughthe revenue-sharing system and/or performance-based incentive scheme.
    關聯: 執法問題研討會論文集,頁0-30
    顯示於類別:[產業經濟學系暨研究所] 會議論文


    檔案 大小格式瀏覽次數
    Bribery, Hierarchical Government, and Incomplete Environmental Enforcement_英文摘要.docx17KbMicrosoft Word136檢視/開啟



    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library & TKU Library IR teams. Copyright ©   - 回饋