本研究以博達案為出發點，探討權益市值高估公司使用盈餘管理工具之情形，本研究以1999年至2009年之台灣上市櫃公司為樣本(資料收集期間為1997年至2011年)。結果發現，博達案發生後，因相關法規趨於嚴格，相較於權益市值低估公司，權益市值高估公司除使用裁決性項目進行盈餘管理外，需再輔以實質盈餘管理工具以達到市場預期。故在權益市值高估公司下，應計項目與實質盈餘管理具互補效果。Zang (2012)認為裁決性應計項目與實質盈餘管理間具替代效果，而本研究係以權益市值高估公司觀點出發，發現當博達案後，查核人員對於裁決性項目之嚴格審核，使權益市值高估公司不得不同時採行兩種盈餘管理方式來管理盈餘。希冀透過本研究之實證結果，釐清投資人對於高股價之迷思。 This study through Procomp Scandal investigates the situation of use the tools of earning management by overvalued equity company. This research uses the companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TWSE) and GreTai Securities Market (GTSM) from 1999 to 2009 (Data collected from 1997 to 2011). Empirical results show that (1) Due to regulations tend to strict after Procomp Scandal, overvalued equity company employ both the discretionary accruals and real earnings management to meet the market expectation compared to the undervalued equity company. (2) In the case of overvalued equity company, discretionary accruals and real earnings management are the complementary relationship. (3) Zang (2012) finds that there is substitution effect between discretionary accruals and real earnings management. However, this paper considers that audit partners audit discretionary accruals much stricter after Procomp Scandal and the overvalued equity company has to use with two methods of earning management to manage earnings. Through the empirical results of this study to clarify the investor for the high price of the myth.
