隨著全球環保及道德意識之高漲，企業除了為了股東追求利潤極大化之外，亦須同時兼顧環境與社會變遷所帶來之影響，負起日益受到重視的社會責任。企業為因應此永續發展經濟型態的轉變及提升企業本身之形象與聲譽，積極地實踐企業社會責任之相關活動，並編製成永續性報告書，供社會大眾檢視其非財務面之資訊。 然而，當經理人與企業產生利益衝突，從事盈餘管理來提高盈餘資訊時，是否藉由實施企業社會責任活動，掩蓋其所作為，或是執行企業社會責任是單純基於對利害關係人之需求所做之一項回應，促使本研究針對以往盈餘管理對企業社會責任爭論不休之議題進行探討。 依據過去文獻中顯示，認證可增加企業非財務資訊揭露之品質，亦也可以減少資訊不對稱，提供利害關係人較為可靠之資訊，然而，在執行認證之情況下，從事盈餘管理的企業，是否會因企業透過永續性的認證，進而影響企業永續性報告資訊品質之關係，亦為本研究探討議題之一。 研究結果顯示企業盈餘管理程度較低，其永續性報告資訊品質較高，亦即當企業盈餘品質較佳時，會降低經理人盈餘管理的誘因，從而滿足各利害關係人之期望，多從事企業社會責任。在將樣本分群為執行認證與未執行認證之企業下，結果顯示永續性認證確實調節了盈餘管理與永續性資訊品質之關聯性。 綜合上述，本研究有別於以往以代理理論之觀點探討盈餘管理與永續性報告資訊品質之關聯性，而是以利害關係人理論探究其關聯性。另外，本研究之實證結果可供投資大眾決策產生參考價值，並且在永續性資訊品質及認證上，可作為社會大眾對企業非財務資訊之揭露及自願性永續性認證作一全面性之了解。 With the increase of environmental protection awareness and ethical consciousness, the firms not merely pursuit the profit maximization for shareholders, but they should be responsible for social and environment. In response to changes of these situations, the firms aggressively take corporate social responsibility (CSR) into their activities and disclose such sustainable information to the public. When the managers’ interests are contrary to the firms, they always use their private information to enhance the earnings. This study discusses whether the managers implement CSR based on the notion of concealing their immoral behaviors or the notion of the responses to stakeholders. Previous study shows that sustainability assurance can enhance the quality of non-financial information and can also reduce information asymmetries between investors and firms. However, this study aims to investigate the relationship between sustainability assurance and sustainability information quality when the firms manage its earning. The study results indicate that the sustainability information quality would be higher in the low level of earning management. This suggests that when the sustainability information quality is good, it reduces the incentive of earning management, and the managers implement more CSR activities to meet stakeholders’ expectations. Furthermore, when sample is divided into assured firms group and non-assured firms group, the results show that sustainability assurance moderates the relationship between earning management and sustainability information quality. Different from the previous study which adopted agency theory, the study explores the relationship between earning management and sustainability information quality based on stakeholder theory. In addition, the study can offer not only value in investors’ decisions but also a comprehensive understanding for the public on non-financial disclosure and voluntary sustainability assurance.
