| Abstract: | 近年來，一連串假帳醜聞風波，但高階主管薪酬卻與公司盈餘不成正比，使得肥貓議題備受全球重視。本研究以2005年至2011年在台灣股票上市上櫃公司為研究對象，樣本公司共有1,351家，其中上市有772家，上櫃有579家，利用Pearson積差相關分析、複迴歸分析方法，以盈餘管理為自變數，公司治理機制為干擾變數(含董監事規模、董事長兼任總經理、大股東持股比率、董監事持股比率、經理人持股比率、法人機構持股比率及四大會計事務所簽證)，高階主管薪酬為應變數，探討盈餘管理、公司治理機制與高階主管薪酬的關係。
本研究發現盈餘管理對公司高階主管薪酬有顯著負向影響。董監事規模、董監事持股比率及四大會計事務所簽證顯著正向干擾盈餘管理對高階主管薪酬的影響。董事長兼任總經理、大股東持股比率、經理人持股比率與法人持股比率顯著負向干擾盈餘管理對高階主管薪酬的影響。公司治理機制的發揮是有效監督高階主管自利行為的關鍵所在，因而如何使高階主管利益與股東的利益趨於一致，減少高階主管藉著盈餘的操弄而增加高階主管薪酬，則是台灣主管當局健全資本市場努力的方向。本研究的研究結果可作為利害相關人士的參考。
There are some financial scandals over the recent years. As the executive compensation is not proportional to the corporation earning, the public’s focus on the issues of Fat Cat. This research is targeted on the companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC) or Over the Counter (OTC) from 2005 to 2011, there are 1,351 sample companies in total, in which 772 companies are listed in TSEC and 579 companies are listed in OTC. Based on Pearson correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis, this study investigates the relationship among earnings management, corporate governance and management compensation. Management compensation is as the dependent variable, the independent variable is the earning management, and moderating variable is the corporate governance which includes board size, chairman also serving as CEO, block shareholding ratio, director shareholding ratio, manager shareholding ratio, investment institution shareholding ratio, and certification of top-four accounting agency.
The findings of this study show the earnings management has negative effect on the management compensation significantly. The board size, investment institution shareholding ratio and the certification of top-four accounting agency significantly increase the effect the earnings management on the management compensation. Contrarily chairman also serving as CEO, block shareholding ratio, manager shareholding ratio and investment institution shareholding ratio significantly decrease the effect of earnings management on the management compensation.
What the key point of effective monitoring executive self-interested behavior, depends on the corporate governance mechanism. Therefore, how to match the interests between the executives and stockholders, and how to avoid the executives’ earnings manipulation for increasing executive compensation are the striving directions of Taiwan authorities for healthy capital market. The result of this study provides the references for the stakeholders of the companies. |
