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    Title: 傷害保險訊息不對稱問題之實證
    Other Titles: Empirical study of asymmetric information problem on the accident insurance
    Authors: 陳敏;Chen, Min
    Contributors: 淡江大學保險學系保險經營碩士班
    汪琪玲;Wang, Kili C.
    Keywords: 傷害保險;訊息不對稱;道德風險;accident insurance;Asymmetric Information;Moral hazard
    Date: 2013
    Issue Date: 2014-01-23 13:42:40 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本論文使用某壽險公司2000年到2010年資料實證研究驗證傷害保險市場之訊息不對稱現象。
    首先,探討傷害保險的道德風險問題是否會因「殘廢程度與保險金給付表」改變,而嚴重?本文效仿Dionne與St-Michel(1991)的類似作法,以意外事故判斷難易度來判斷道德風險。結果發現,「殘廢程度與保險金給付表」的改變,並沒有造成更嚴重的道德風險問題。
    其次,本文也探討「殘廢程度與保險金給付表」這個制度改變,是否對訊息不對稱現象形成影響,並且關心在傷害保險上,外生變數對市場之訊息不對稱問題的影響。結果顯示:「殘廢程度與保險金給付表」修正,對訊息不對稱沒有顯著影響。在觀察外生變數對訊息不對稱的影響上,可以發現性別、年齡、職業類別與居住地區對訊息不對稱的嚴重程度有顯著影響。此外,本研究也發現:在A契約中的殘廢給付中,購買愈高保障的個人,愈傾向透過私人、小型醫院就醫及出險,而這有較高的可能是道德風險。
    The paper analyzed the asymmetric information problems using the data from a life insurance company between year 2000 and 2010.
    First, the paper investigated whether the amendment of the benefits of disability degrees for accident insurance in 1996 might affect the moral hazard problem. Similar to the method used by Dionne and St-Michel(1991), we used the difficulty of determination of accidents to identify the moral hazard effect. We did not find significant evidence to support the effect of the amendment of the system on the moral hazard effect
    Next to that, we also concerned whether the change of the system has influence on the asymmetric information problems and which exogenous variables are related to the problems. Empirical results showed that the amendment of the system has no significant effect on the asymmetric information problems. In terms of exogenous variable observed in this study, we found that gender, age, occupational category and residential areas could impact the severity of the information asymmetry. Besides, in sample A contract, we found the insured with higher coverage tend to be treated in the private or small hospitals, rather than the public or major hospitals. It is likely to imply the moral hazard exists.
    Appears in Collections:[保險學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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