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    Title: 公司治理對壽險業自由現金流量影響之研究
    Other Titles: Corporate governance on free cash flow in the life insurance industry
    Authors: 李政謙;Li, Cheng-Chien
    Contributors: 淡江大學保險學系保險經營碩士班
    何佳玲
    Keywords: 公司治理;自由現金流量;金融風暴;壽險業;corporate governance;free cash flow;Financial crisis;Life Insurance Industry
    Date: 2013
    Issue Date: 2014-01-23 13:42:15 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: Jensen(1986)提出的自由現金流量假說顯示當自由現金流量增加時,公司股東與經理人之間的利益衝突會加劇,因為經理人對自由現金流量的濫用與股東的利益不一致,進而導致代理成本的增加。由於壽險業資金龐大,為了抑制自由現金流量的濫用,公司治理機制扮演重要的角色。本研究以2005年至2011年台灣21家壽險公司為樣本,檢視公司治理變數與自由現金流量間的關係。實證結果顯示,當壽險公司規模越大、整體經營風險愈高時,自由現金流量也越高,然而公司治理變數並未顯著影響自由現金流量。究其可能原因為台灣企業間的交叉持股情形相當嚴重,企業的經營又與家族關係密切,因此大多數企業的董事或監察人多為同一家族者所擔任,造成部分家族與大股東操作公司經營,以致於公司治理制度未能彰顯。然考量金融風暴後,獨立董事占董事會人數的比例與自由現金流量呈顯著正相關,此即顯示在金融風暴後,獨立董事占董事會人數的比率愈高,為考量資產流動率之適足性、確保壽險公司之清償能力,自由現金流量較金融風暴前增加。
    This study applies Jensen’s (1986) Free Cash Flow Hypothesis to investigate the impact of corporate governance on free cash flow in the life insurance industry in Taiwan. Jensen (1986) argues that the increasing of free cash flow represent an incremental cost of the owner-manager conflict, because the existence of free cash flow provides managers with an opportunity to waste cash on unprofitable investments. The sample comprises 21 life insurance companies in Taiwan for 2005 through 2011. We find that larger firms and insurers with higher total risk tend to hold more free cash flow. However, we find that the impact of corporate governance on free cash flow is insignificant. The possible reason is the close relationship between corporate management and family controlling. Most of the directors on the board and supervisors are served by the same family, so the corporate governance system can’t work effectively. Finally, we examine the impact of financial crisis on free cash flow and show that a significant positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors and free cash flow. This implies that independent directors will tend to hold more free cash flow to maintain the liquidity of assets and avoid default risk after financial crisis.
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of Insurance Insurance] Thesis

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