English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Items with full text/Total items : 49432/84396 (59%)
Visitors : 7457701      Online Users : 100
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library & TKU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/93359

    Title: Does Corporate Governance Affect the Relationship Between Earnings Management and Firm Performance? An Endogenous Switching Regression Model,Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
    Authors: Tang, Hui-wen;Chang, Chong-chuo
    Contributors: 淡江大學保險學系
    Keywords: Corporate governance;Earnings management;Firm performance;Endogenous switching regression model;Discretionary current accruals
    Date: 2015-07-01
    Issue Date: 2013-12-27 16:07:02 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: Springer New York LLC
    Abstract: This study investigates whether corporate governance affects the relationship between earnings management and firm performance by using Taiwanese data. We used an endogenous switching regression model to classify firms into strong and weak governance regimes based on an endogenously determined threshold. The results show that discretionary accruals (DAs) and discretionary current accruals (DCAs) have significantly negative effects on return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s q for firms in a weak governance regime. This implies that managers in weakly governed firms are more likely to abuse accounting discretion than those in strongly governed firms, leading to decreased firm performance. Managers prefer using DCAs rather than DAs to window-dress financial earnings, but this causes a greater reversal of corporate value in the subsequent period. Conversely, DAs and DCAs are positively and significantly related to firm performance in a strong governance regime. This indicates that managers under strong governance typically exercise optimal accounting choices to respond to varied economic conditions, or to avoid costly debt-covenant violations, potentially enhancing firm value.
    Relation: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 45(1), pp.33-58
    DOI: 10.1007/s11156-013-0427-z
    Appears in Collections:[保險學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat

    All items in 機構典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library & TKU Library IR teams. Copyright ©   - Feedback