Compensation system and earnings inequality

淡江大學機構典藏 > 商管學院 > 經濟學系暨研究所 > 會議論文 > Item 987654321/93023

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題名:	Compensation system and earnings inequality
作者:	Jiang, Lily;Yu, His-cheng
貢獻者:	淡江大學經濟學系
關鍵詞:	performance pay;principal-agent theory;income inequality
日期:	2010-10
上傳時間:	2013-11-07 14:58:04 (UTC+8)
出版者:	新北市：淡江大學經濟學系
摘要:	We develop a wage determination model in which a firm decides the pattern of compensation schemes, as well as offering a sequence of ontracts for her heterogeneous employees. Based on the theoretical analysis, we set up a random-effects regression model to explore and compare the wage determination under perform-pay and non-performance-pay jobs. Using data from the Panel Study of Family Dynamics in Taiwan, we find that firms employ high-ability workers and offer high returns to workers' ability on performance-pay jobs. We also show that the pervasive distribution of workers' ability generates higher inequality of earnings under performance-pay than non-performance-pay scheme. This implies that a shift in compensation scheme away from non-performance pay toward performance-pay will lead to an increase in wage inequality.
關聯:	2010淡江經濟論壇研討會論文集，36頁
顯示於類別:	[經濟學系暨研究所] 會議論文

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