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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/93023


    Title: Compensation system and earnings inequality
    Authors: Jiang, Lily;Yu, His-cheng
    Contributors: 淡江大學經濟學系
    Keywords: performance pay;principal-agent theory;income inequality
    Date: 2010-10
    Issue Date: 2013-11-07 14:58:04 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 新北市:淡江大學經濟學系
    Abstract: We develop a wage determination model in which a firm decides the pattern of compensation schemes, as well as offering a sequence of ontracts for her heterogeneous employees. Based on the theoretical analysis, we set up a random-effects regression model to explore and compare the wage determination under perform-pay and non-performance-pay jobs. Using data from the Panel Study of Family Dynamics in Taiwan, we find that firms employ high-ability workers and offer high returns to workers' ability on performance-pay jobs. We also show that the pervasive distribution of workers' ability generates higher inequality of earnings under performance-pay than non-performance-pay scheme. This implies that a shift in compensation scheme away from non-performance pay toward performance-pay will lead to an increase in wage inequality.
    Relation: 2010淡江經濟論壇研討會論文集,36頁
    Appears in Collections:[經濟學系暨研究所] 會議論文

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