A note on bank default risk under government capital injection coinciding with high future loss expectation

淡江大學機構典藏 > 商管學院 > 國際企業學系暨研究所 > 期刊論文 > Item 987654321/91626

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题名:	A note on bank default risk under government capital injection coinciding with high future loss expectation
作者:	Lin, Jyh-horng;Chang, Chuen-Ping;Lin, Hsiao-Ning
贡献者:	淡江大學國際企業學系
关键词:	government capital injection;adverse signal;interest margin;bank failure;barrier
日期:	2013-07-08
上传时间:	2013-07-22 14:00:26 (UTC+8)
出版者:	Abingdon: Routledge
摘要:	This article proposes a framework for bank default risk measure under government capital injection explicitly coinciding with an adverse signal that a rescued bank is expected to have significant future losses. A bank facing a serious problem of early closure may have a strong incentive to participate in a government assistance programme. Recipients of government capital injections are encouraged to make additional loans at a reduced margin, and then increase the default risk in the bank's equity returns. These results may be due to the conflicting goals of the government's capital injection programme for bank recapitalization and bank lending.
關聯:	Applied Economics Letters 20(15), pp.1368-1373
DOI:	10.1080/13504851.2013.810326
显示于类别:	[國際企業學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

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