本文設立一雙占模型,討論不同猜測變量下,專利擁有者的授權行為。考慮專利擁有者授權後仍與被授權廠商在產品市場進行數量競爭的假設下,本文得到:第一、在非劇烈創新且市場越不競爭時,授權廠商越可能以固定權利金授權。第二、考慮廠商間的競爭程度後,若授權廠商以單位權利金授權,其最適單位權利金可能小於授權前後的成本差距。
This paper develops a duopoly model to investigate the licensing behavior of inside licensors under different competitive relationships with its competitor and a conjectural variations approach is employed. Assuming that both the licensor and licensee engage in a quantitative competition in the same industry after licensing, we obtain the following results. First, the less competitive a market with a non-drastic innovation, the more likely the licensor would prefer a fixed-fee licensing to a royalty licensing. Second, considering the magnitude of competition between firms, the optimal royalty rate could be smaller than the cost reduction after licensing when the licensor is responsible for selecting a royalty licensing regime.
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應用經濟論叢=Taiwan Journal of Applied Economics 95,頁 35-59