Insider Trading, Accrual Abuse, and Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets - Evidence from Taiwan

doi:10.1016/j.pacfin.2013.04.005

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Title:	Insider Trading, Accrual Abuse, and Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets - Evidence from Taiwan
Other Titles:	內部人交易、應計項目濫用與公司治理在新興市場中的關係
Authors:	Tang, Hui-wen;Chen, An-lin;Chang, Chong-chuo
Contributors:	淡江大學保險學系
Keywords:	異常應計項目;控制權;公司治理;盈餘管理;家族控制;內部人交易;Abnormal Accruals;Control Rights;Corporate Governance;Earnings Management;Family Control;Insider Trading
Date:	2013-09-01
Issue Date:	2013-05-02 17:55:18 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	Amsterdam: Elsevier BV * North-Holland
Abstract:	This study investigates the endogenous relationship between abnormal insider trading and accrual abuse, and explores whether corporate governance affects this relationship. Our results suggest that insiders take advantage of private information on abnormal accruals to time their trading and manipulate accruals opportunistically to mislead the stock market prior to their planned trading. More important, we find that the abuse of inside information for stock trading becomes more serious when a firm’s ultimate controller has a great divergence of control rights (or seat-control rights) from cash flow rights. We also find that higher family ownership and control, increased managerial ownership, or a dual leadership structure not only induces more private information trading prior to financial reports disclosure, but also intensifies accrual abuse for future trading. The results for composite governance indices are also consistent with our expectation. Taken together, our evidence suggests that a poor corporate governance system interacts with abnormal insider trading and abnormal accruals, thereby aggravating insider expropriation on outside investors. 本研究檢視內部人交易與異常應計項目之間的內生關係，並探究公司治理機制對該關係的影響。研究結果顯示，公司內部人會利用其擁有異常應計項目之私有資訊，以掌握股票交易時機，在財務報表公告前先行調整持股；甚至操縱應計項目以誤導股市，使其能在後續股票交易中增加獲利或減少損失。更重要的是，本研究發現，當公司最終控制者的股份控制權(或席次控制權)與現金流量權之偏離程度較高時，內部人濫用異常應計項目之私有資訊以進行股票交易的情況，會更加嚴重。本研究亦發現，當公司的家族所有權與控制權愈大、管理者持股比率愈高，或是採用董事長兼任總經理的領導結構，均更加誘發內部人在財務報表揭露前的私有資訊交易，也會加劇以會計裁量權進行盈餘操縱的程度，以利內部人後續持股部位的調整。本研究另採用主成份分析方法建構整合性的公司治理指標，其實證結果亦符合上述研究發現。總而言之，本研究實證結果顯示，不良的公司治理系統會影響異常內部人交易及異常應計項目之間的關係，進而使得內部人藉由私有資訊及會計裁量權以掠奪外部投資人財富的情況更加惡化。
Relation:	Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 24, pp.132-155 【SSCI】【國科會財務領域 A tier2 級國際期刊】
DOI:	10.1016/j.pacfin.2013.04.005
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute & Department of Insurance Insurance] Journal Article

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