首先，實證結果顯示台灣企業的企業績效與經理人薪酬之間呈現顯著正相關，與先前文獻一致。此外，實證結果亦顯示台灣企業只設有薪酬下限，並未設立薪酬上限，此結果和Shaw and Zhang (2010)之實證結果相異。再者，本研究發現信用風險越高，績效對薪酬的敏感度越低，顯示企業藉由薪酬敏感度適應企業整體的信用風險。然而，當企業的市場風險越高，則績效對薪酬的敏感度越高，顯示企業將補償經理人所承擔的風險溢酬。最後，本研究將道德風險分為股權偏離度、席次偏離度和經理人持股率。就偏離度的部份，研究結果顯示以盈餘為基礎時，企業的偏離度越大，則績效對薪酬敏感度就越高。然而，以市場為基礎時，顯示企業偏離度越大，則績效對薪酬敏感度就越低。在經理人持股率的部份，僅顯示持股率越高和總薪酬之關係呈正相關，並未顯示經理人持股會干擾薪酬敏感度。整體而言，企業的各項風險將會影響經理人薪酬合約的制定內容。
This paper investigates the relationship between firm’s performance and its top managers’ compensation, and research whether firm’s risks affect the relationship between firm’s performance and its top managers’ compensation or not, and we divide firm’s performance ROA and stock returns; separate firm’s risks operating risk, credit risk, market risk, and moral risk.
The empirical results of this paper are listed as follow:
First of all, the empirical result shows that top managers’ compensation is significantly positively correlated with firm’s performance. Moreover, it also reveals that Taiwanese firms have no cap (upper bound) to their top managers’ compensation, but they have bogey (lower bound), and this result is inconsistent with Shaw and Zhang (2010) study. Additionally, we find that firms with higher credit risk have lower pay-for-performance sensitivity, indicating firms use pay-for-performance sensitivity to adapt firm credit risk. Nevertheless, when market risk gets higher, pay-for-compensation sensitivity becomes higher, revealing firm would compensate top managers’ risk premium. Finally, we separate moral risk stock divergence, board divergence, and top managers’ share-holding rate. On earnings-based measure, the higher divergence is, the higher pay-for-performance sensitivity is; however, on market-based measure, the higher divergence is, the lower pay-for-performance sensitivity is. Furthermore, we find that pay-for- performance sensitivity is not affected by top managers’ share-holding rate, but the relation between top managers’ share-holding rate and total compensation is positive.