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    Title: 企業社會責任, 盈餘管理與公司治理之關聯性
    Other Titles: The relationship between corporate social responsibility, earnings management and corporate governance
    Authors: 侯琇玟;Hou, Shiou-wen
    Contributors: 淡江大學會計學系碩士班
    郭樂平;Kuo, Lo-pin
    Keywords: 企業社會責任;盈餘管理;公司治理;corporate social responsibility;Earnings Management;corporate governance
    Date: 2012
    Issue Date: 2013-04-13 11:30:46 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 近年來,企業社會責任(CSR)蓬勃的發展,但有學者卻發現經理人是為了操作盈餘管理,而履行CSR活動,藉此隱藏企業惡化的營運狀況,然而CSR活動將耗費企業資源,影響企業的CSR績效評價,所以需要有良好的公司治理機制對經理人制定的CSR活動作監督,但利害關係人間存在利益衝突,因此本研究以一般最小平方法,探究不同公司治理機制監督經理人CSR績效評價所扮演的角色。
    研究結果顯示,企業盈餘管理程度較低(盈餘品質較佳)時,其CSR績效評價較高,亦即,當企業財務績效較佳時,會降低經理人盈餘管理的誘因,而為了建立聲譽會趨向滿足利害關係人的期望,從事較多CSR的活動,並提升企業的CSR績效。此外,不同公司治理由於利益的衝突,導致監督經理人制定CSR活動的呈不亦有所不同,發現日本外部董事及獨立董事身分超然獨立且具備專門知識及公司業務的攸關性,因此,不僅能抑制經理人盈餘管理意圖,還能從宏觀的角度帶領企業經理人從事讓企業價值提升的CSR行動,連帶創造提升CSR績效評價的效果。反之,大股東及外國機構投資人由於私人利益而無法達到此效果。女性董事則因人數過少,無法影響董事會的決策,亦無法達到此效果。本研究進一步對不同公司治理對CSR績效之各構面的重視程度作檢視,發現獨立董事對CSR績效之人才活用構面及公司治理構面有積極的影響,而女性董事則會對社會議題的CSR績效有正向顯著影響。
    綜合上述,本研究針對以往盈餘管理對CSR爭論不休之議題進行探討,並透過實證發現日本不同公司治理機制對於監督企業從事CSR投資行動上,存在著利益的衝突,因而導致不同的公司治理機制角色對企業的CSR行動的支持無法趨同,進而使得經理人執行CSR的積極性及程度不一致,最終將影響企業的CSR績效。
    In recent years, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is booming development, but the studies find that managers implement CSR activities in order to manipulate earning and to hide the operation which is getting worse. The CSR activities consume enterprise resource, which affects enterprises’ sustainable development, so a good corporate governance mechanism would monitor the managers to develop CSR policy. However, there are conflicts of interest between different stakeholders. We use Ordinary Least Squares to find which corporate governance mechanism in Japan could inhibit earnings management and improve CSR performance evaluation at the same time.
    Empirical result indicates that corporations with better earning quality have higher CSR performance, revealing managers have less incentives to manage earnings when their corporation have better CSR performance. Moreover, to meet stakeholders’ expectations, managers carefully choose CSR activities to enhance CSR performance. Additionally, this paper also investigates whether corporate governance mechanisms affect the relationship between CSR and earning management. According to the result, outside and independent directors understand relevant professional knowledge and corporate operation very well, so they could not only control managers'' intention to manage earnings but also create the effect of CSR performance. However, major shareholders and foreign institutional investors do not have the effect owing to conflict of interest. Female directors could not affect the board’s decisions nor have the effect because female directors are minor. Due to conflict of interest, corporate governance mechanisms which monitor managers'' CSR activities are different.
    Furthermore, we research the different corporate governance mechanisms to four dimensions of CSR performance evaluation, and then the result shows that independent directors have a positive impact on CSR performance of human resource and corporate governance dimensions. Female directors have a positive effect on CSR performance of society dimension. Overall, different corporate governance mechanisms in Japan have different role to monitor the CSR initiatives and ultimately affect CSR performance.
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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