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    Title: 雙占企業綠色定價賽局之研究
    Other Titles: Green pricing analysis in duopoly environment
    Authors: 李鈺風;Lee, Yue-Fong
    Contributors: 淡江大學管理科學學系碩士班
    曹銳勤;Tsaur, Ruey-chyn
    Keywords: 綠色供應鏈;寡占;賽局理論;Cournot均衡;Stackelberg均衡;Green Supply Chain;Duopoly;Game Theory;Cournot Equilibrium;Stackelberg Equilibrium
    Date: 2012
    Issue Date: 2013-04-13 11:23:27 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 隨著科技發展的進步,許多產品的生產成本降低、產品生產速度快速,廠商為了獲得高獲取利潤,進而生產過多的商品將造成了不必要的浪費。政府為了因應此問題的產生,開始推行政策促進綠色供應鏈發展,並對於製造商、回收商、再製商做了一連串的因應措施。政府制定相關政策時,大多僅對再製品回收物流部分做一連串的補貼措施,往往忽略掉整體產品市場所造成的影響。本研究探討政府在不同競爭市場下,對參與綠色供應鏈成員的最適補貼政策。
    從廠商及政府兩方角度出發,目標廠商能獲得最大利潤,亦可達到最大社會福利目的。政府在進行補貼下,因應不同的市場狀況、補貼分配比例,做不同的補貼政策。研究模型為兩階段的賽局模型,在兩家產出相同的廠商、價格競爭下,考慮政府與廠商決策互動的情況,根據不同的賽局理論找出政府之最適補貼政策,以供政府日後對相關補貼策略參考。除了以廠商及政府角度考量整體供應鏈運作,亦將市場需求、新產品及再製品評價因素加入,透過分析觀察這些因素對於綠色供應鏈整體利潤、社會福利、產品需求所產生的影響。
    研究顯示,政府進行補貼政策除了須考量補貼金額之外,消費者與廠商之間分配比例對整體綠色供應鏈更為重要。兩廠商進行市場競爭下,亦有可能單一生產新產品亦或再製品已達到自身利潤最大化情況。政府必須觀察市場是否因兩廠商之間勾結,而造成產品社會福利因此減少,必要之時需介入控制市場。
    As the advances in technological development, many products’ costs could be reduced and the production speed is fast. Manufacturers producing too many goods in order to obtain high profit, but the result is unnecessary waste. To solve this problem, governments start the implementation of policies to promote the development of green supply chain, and make a series of measures to manufacturers, recyclers, and reproduction. Government to develop policy, to emphasize a series of subsidies in recycling logistics, often ignore the impact of the overall product market. In this study, confering the optimal subsidy policy to green supply chain members on competitive market.
    The view of this study is starting from both sides of the manufacturers and the government point, and the goal is manufacturers gets maximize profits, ans achieve maximum social welfare purposes. government conducts different subsidy policies in response to different market conditions, and proportion of the distribution of subsidies. Research model for a two-stage game model, the two manufacturers have the same outputs , consider the situation of the government and party decision-making interaction in price competition. Depending on the game theory to find the optimal subsidy policy of the government for future reference the relevant subsidy policy. In addition to overall supply chain operations, will add market demand, new product and product evaluation factors, analyzing the impact of these factors that is the green supply chain profit, social welfare, product demand with the manufacturers and government''s consideration.
    This study shows that the government subsidy policy except consider the amount of subsidies, the distribution ratio between the consumer and the manufacturer is more important to the overall green supply chain. The two firms in market competition may also be a single production of new products or re-products that reaching its own profit-maximizing situation. The government must observe the market between the two firms colluded to cause the social welfare thus reducing. Necessary to intervene and control the market.
    Appears in Collections:[管理科學學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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