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|Other Titles: ||A theoretical model of deception and mental mechanism|
|Authors: ||陳顥賢;Chen, Hao-Hsien|
|Keywords: ||罪惡感;自尊心;不完全訊息靜態賽局;純策略貝氏均衡;Guilt;Esteem;Incomplete Information Game;Pure Strategy Bayesian Equilibrium|
|Issue Date: ||2013-04-13 11:01:03 (UTC+8)|
When we talk about trade, everything could be considered by economics. The trust between trading counterparts determinant to the trading equilibrium and its efficiency is an important issue. On the other hand, deception will increase transaction cost which may cutback the benefit from trading; that is, the welfare will be overestimated once we ignore the inefficiency which deception causes. Therefore, if the government makes economic policies without taking deception problem into consideration, it might make wrong decisions, leading to higher social costs.
Due to the importance of trust, we want to explore theoretically the decision of deception, and further give some policy recommendations on improving trading efficiency. Compared to the traditional deception theory, our model not only incorporates factors of mentality, which aim to describe the difference of personal characters, but also preserves the framework of strategic interaction. By doing so, our model can be more practical. Moreover, adding the mental variables can characterize the mental cost arisen from deception. For instance, someone will expect to experience the reduction of esteem if he or she is deceived, and will expect to have the feelings of guilt if he or she deceives. Further, since the mental characters are subjective and hard to be observed, our model indicates that people’s types can be represented by mental characters which are their own private information . More specifically, players in a deception game don’t know each other’s types exactly. In this situation, people just like facing a person who chooses mixed strategies. By this way, we can get a pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium which warrants that no one will regret in the equilibrium.
Based on the inference of the deception model, we find that the conjecture of the counterpart’s type is the key factor to determine whether deceive or not. At the view of information spreading, there are many ways to report the common knowledge, and especially media can report it relevant to consumers or producers. Recognizing the influence of media, we suggest that media should report more about “consumers’ tendency to fight for their right”, and less about “producers’ desire to value their reputation” so as to decrease the probability of deception and increase the probability of belief.
|Appears in Collections:||[經濟學系暨研究所] 學位論文|
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