淡江大學機構典藏:Item 987654321/87297
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    Title: 以賽局角度分析投機攻擊與央行干預匯市策略 : 以亞洲金融風暴為例
    Other Titles: Co-opetition strategies of central bank's foreign exchange intervention to speculative attacks : an example from Asian financial crisis
    Authors: 樊儀之;Fan, Yi-Chih
    Contributors: 淡江大學國際商學碩士在職專班
    蔡政言;Tsai, Jeng-Yan
    Keywords: 亞洲金融風暴;競合理論;投機;Asian Financial Crisis;Co-opetition;speculate
    Date: 2012
    Issue Date: 2013-04-13 10:56:17 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究利用競合理論之PARTS分析,以參與者的想法、回應與策略等各種需求切入,並探討中央銀行、投機行為間在金融市場互動之關係。並以1997年7月2日泰國爆發貨幣危機為例,且同步就鄰近國家香港、韓國及台灣等貨幣市場及股票市場進行研究。結果顯示,各國匯率制度失當與快速移動的國際資本為導致貨幣金融危機發生之主因,而央行外匯管制為賽局中的主要戰術,唯有適時進行引導或管制,並以聯合各國央行共同抵禦熱錢方式,才可能結束單一賽局,而不致延伸為無數賽局並衍生成區域性的金融風暴。
    This study uses of Co-opetition theories PARTS to analysis that player’s thinking, reply and tactic strategies for their needs. And, make inquiry the relationship between the central bank and speculative participants in the financial markets. From the example on July 2, 1997, the outbreak of the currency crisis in Thailand, I synchronous study on the currency markets and stock markets in neighboring countries, Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan. The results show that exchange rate system failure and fast-moving international capital lead to a main cause of the financial and currency crisis. The central bank foreign exchange controls may be the most important tactics in this game, and only timely and appropriately guide and intervention and combined together with the efforts of other countries central banks can afford to resist the hot money, This may be completely limited to only a single game, and not an extension of the numerous games and derivative into regional financial and currency crisis.
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of International Business] Thesis

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