在現今相互依存的國際貿易關係中，國際間相互協調的貿易政策的選擇不僅僅取決於國內不同利益團體的回應，而且必須考慮到國際經濟組織和其他國家的互動賽局策略。因此，本文研究以台灣與中國大陸的貿易關係為例，探討以納許均衡進行策略性貿易政策的結果，並以特定的例子來說明，管理貿易政策(例如經貿合作ECFA的方式)是各國在無法達到最佳目標模式時所可能選擇的次佳目標模式，此種模式可能為一種各國適應國際經濟發展與其最大化其參與國際分工利益的制度安排。本文並接著探討當兩岸經貿關係存在著類似囚犯兩難的賽局時，針對兩國貿易政策選擇層面上的賽局行為進行分析，接著進一步地探討當報酬是可被拆解細項去區分時，所可能產生的情形。並以長期考量合作效益的角度去分析，雙方將可能如何達成談判的結果與長期履行ECFA的承諾。 Under currently interdependent and concerted international trade conditions, coordinating trade policies between countries do not have to consider the possible respones from different groups with their own interests domestically, but also need to think strategically and interactivly with the interactions with the other international economic organizations and countries in a game structure. Thus, this study takes the trade relation between Taiwan and minland China as an example to discuss the possible development of such a strategic trade policy from the analysis of Nash equilibrium in a game setup and tries to illustrate the possibles outcomes by providing some particular examples. This study concludes that managing trade policies may be the second best choice when difficulties arise for countries to reach their best trade policies. That is, the second best may be the solution for countries to serch for their comparative advantages and may take the advantage of the benefit of international specification. In addition, this study goes on the analysis of strategic behavior of the interacting trade policy between Taiwan and China based on the concept of game theory. By employing the classical prisoner''s dilemma from the game theory, this study is able to derive the possible interacting trade policies across Taiwn strait. Furthermore, it probes into what circumstances may probably occur when payoff can actually be decomposited into the subtle in parts. The study ends with the discussion of the benefits of cooperation internationally from the long run perspective terms and of how to achieve the desired outcomes in negotiations and to commit the promises of ECFA for both sides.
