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    Title: 雙占市場下獨家交易契約的效果
    Other Titles: The effect of exclusive dealing contracts in successive duopoly market
    Authors: 李依潔;Lee, Yi-Chieh
    Contributors: 淡江大學產業經濟學系碩士班
    陳宜亨;Chen, Yi-Heng
    Keywords: 獨家交易;上下游雙占;固定比例生產;Exclusive Dealing Contracts;Downstream Duopoly;UpstreamDuopoly;Fixed Produce Function
    Date: 2012
    Issue Date: 2013-04-13 10:52:54 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本論文以探討單一廠商利潤極大為出發點,在市場中上下游廠商皆為雙占的情況之下,選定上游其中一家廠商為目標廠商,在面臨上游對手廠商沒有採行獨家交易契約與採行獨家交易契約的市場情況下,目標廠商該決定何種因應策略?再以數值分析方法探討下游廠商成本又會如何影響上游目標廠商的利潤。
    本論文依據Chang(1992)的市場架構設定與Salinger(1988)的Cournot市場競爭方式,研究結果得出:當對手上游廠商沒有獨家交易的時候,第一家上游廠商必然會選擇限制下游獨家交易做為因應策略。當對手上游廠商做限制上游獨家交易的時候,第一家上游廠商有無獨家交易並沒有差別,當對手上游廠商做限制下游獨家交易的時候,則必須取決於下游兩家廠商成本而訂定不同因應策略。
    Based on the market structure in Chang(1992)and the derived demand from Cournot competition as in Salinger(1988), this paper set up a market structure with two upstream firms and two downstream firms to investigate the effect of upstream rival’s choice of exclusive dealing contract on the other upstream firm’s choice of exclusion as well as its profit.
    We find that if the upstream rival does not imply any kind of exclusive dealing contract, either upward exclusive dealing or downward exclusive dealing, the other upstream firm will choose downward exclusive dealing contract. If the upstream rival uses upward exclusive dealing contract, the other upstream firm is indifferent from having exclusive dealing contract or not. But if the upstream rival firm has downward exclusive dealing contract, the other upstream firm’s choice will depend on the production cost of two downstream firms.
    Appears in Collections:[產業經濟學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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