鮑威爾在兩次波灣戰爭之角色 : 檢視與評析

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題名:	鮑威爾在兩次波灣戰爭之角色 : 檢視與評析
其他題名:	Examining and analyzing general Colin Powell's roles in the two Persian Gulf Wars
作者:	葛鎮東;Ko, Chen-Tung
貢獻者:	淡江大學美洲研究所博士班李本京;Lee, Thomas B.
關鍵詞:	鮑威爾;不情願的戰士;溫伯格用兵條件;波灣戰爭;國家安全決策;Colin Powell;Reluctant Warriors;the Weinberger Criteria on the Use of Force;the Persian Gulf War;National Security Decision-Making
日期:	2013
上傳時間:	2013-04-13 10:19:57 (UTC+8)
摘要:	鮑威爾將軍是1990年代橫跨軍政兩界之耀眼巨星，他於1979年成為當時美軍最年輕之將領後，於很短時間內接續擔任國安顧問、美軍聯參會議主席，以及國務卿等職。他非但是首個出任該三個重要國安職務的非洲裔美國人，亦是迄今曾歷練過該三項職務的唯一美國人。他因成功率領美軍執行沙漠風暴軍事行動而一舉躍居全國性舞台，之後又因正直、卓越領導、克服種族逆境等特質而備受美國民眾愛戴與尊敬。鮑威爾可說是過去1/4世紀間美國外交與國防政策最具代表性人物之一，身歷多次外交與國防政策辯論，其中包括越戰後美國軍力該如何運用、如何定位冷戰後美國之地位、1989年的巴拿馬軍事行動，以及兩場波灣戰爭。然相對於他高人氣戰爭英雄形象，包括總統在內諸多國安高層都批評鮑威爾抵制以武力做為因應危機的首要方式，而鮑威爾也因此在兩次波灣危機決策過程中均遭到程度不等地邊緣化、甚至孤立。然極端保守軍事思維並未影響鮑威爾的仕途，他仍然一路平步青雲，直到2004年小布希總統要求他辭去國務卿職務。本論文要由鮑威爾的軍旅生涯與行事風格，以及越戰後美國軍事思維演進之角度切入，來分析鮑威爾採取如此保守軍事決策的可能原因，以及此一保守立場與他仕途之關聯，期望藉此來增進對此一重要、但又謎樣般人物的瞭解。本文的主要結論有四： 1.1960年代興起之民權運動所帶動種族議題進展，鮑威爾因條件配合而於1970年代初期起被不次拔擢，以展示美軍方為族群和諧所做之努力。1990年代，鮑爾因身為少數族裔奮鬥典範，又使他成為共和、民主兩黨所積極爭取之目標，以爭取種族牌之政治效益。然若除去政治光芒，鮑威爾應僅係事務型人才，缺乏成為宏觀國安決策者所需之戰略眼光。 2.鮑威爾雖反對以軍事干預做為首要外交工具，但他在可能動武的危機決策過程中均隨時關注總統動向，而當兩位布希總統做出發動戰爭的決定後，鮑威爾隨之妥協配合，並協助掃除戰爭障礙，以證明其存在價值。以鮑威爾之政治智慧與歷練，他此種反軍事介入之決策行為應是精明之政治計算，藉由迎合越戰後美國社會的反戰情緒，將自己形塑為謹慎用兵之軍事領袖，藉以爭取民眾認同與累積政治資本，但又不至於激怒最高決策者。 3.鮑威爾因反對以武力干預做為解決外交危機的首要方式，因此又被稱為「不情願的戰士」。此種保守軍事思維源自於美軍越戰慘痛教訓：包括不能讓文人領袖壟斷戰爭權力、美國軍力有其限制、戰爭須為最後手段，以及美國民眾並非無限度支持戰爭。此等觀點日後均被融入「溫柏格用兵條件」，嚴格規範美軍的軍力運用，以避免重蹈越戰覆轍。然美軍由越戰潰敗所歸納之教訓不無以偏概全、甚至謬誤情形，這使「溫柏格用兵條件」存在一定缺陷，而鮑威爾一昧堅持該用兵條件，使得他的軍事建議難以為政治高層所接受，並導致他在兩次波灣戰爭決策過程遭到邊緣化。 4.鮑威爾在政治光譜上相當中性，從未展露明顯的意識形態或政治傾向，這使得他易於被不同政治屬性之美國民眾接受。然此一政治中性特點在9/11攻擊事件後成為他的最大弱點，他在小布希政府內之主要對手「新保守主義派」雖然主張激進軍事路線，但因強調傳統美國政治意識與理念，因而被小布希委以主導美國外交政策之責任，這也使得鮑威爾與其所代表之保守軍事理念在9/11後逐步趨向衰落。 General Colin L. Powell (1937-present), a political superstar of the 1990s, has an extraordinary political and military career. He was promoted to the general rank in 1979 at the age of 41, and then in short order national security advisor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the secretary of state. He was not only the first African American to serve in each of the three important national security assignments, but also the only American in history to hold those three positions. Being propelled onto the national stage for his leading role in the overwhelming military success of Operation Desert Storm (1991), he has since then remained immensely popular among Americans due to his integrity, leadership, and the ability to transcend racial barriers. Few figures in the past quarter century have played a more prominent role in American foreign and defense policy than Colin Powell, who was deeply engaged in the most important foreign and defense policy debates, such as the uses of American force in the wake of Vietnam, the quest for America’s new role in the post Cold-War world, the interventions in Panama (1989), and the two Gulf Wars (1991 and 2003). However, contrary to his popular image as a war hero, Powell was highly criticized by many top decision-makers, the presidents included, for his resistance to seeing military force as the primary foreign policy instrument in responding to crises. As a result, he was fundamentally marginalized or even isolated in the decision-making processes leading to the two Gulf Wars. Interestingly, his ultra-conservative military belief did not in any way diminish his chance in rising up the ladder of success, not at least until 2004 when George W. Bush asked him to resign as Secretary of State due to policy differences. By closely examining Powell’s military career and personal traits, as well as the evolution of military thinking since Vietnam, this dissertation seeks to unravel the myths surrounding this important, yet enigmatic figure, by analyzing what were the rationales behind Powell’s advocacy of military restraint and its linkage to his career. There are four major findings. 1. Race did play a role in Powell’s remarkable career and was major factor at numerous points in his rapid ascent. He was specifically selected and nurtured in the early 1970s to serve as evidence of the efforts by the US military to promote racial progress. In the 1990s, his image as a role model for minorities made him a sought-after figure by both the Republicans and the Democrats in order to exploit the race card to political advantage. However, his image as a political superstar obfuscated the fact that he was more a functionary figure than a strategic thinker. 2. Although Powell opposed the notion that military force should be the predominant foreign policy instrument, he closely monitored the president in times of foreign policy crises in which the use of force was considered. When the two Bushes decided to go for military options against Saddam Hussein, Powell quickly compromised, and was swayed to a pro-war stance, making himself useful by helping eliminate barriers to successful military operations. Powell’s anti-interventionist decision-making approach was based on sophisticated political calculations. It was wise for him to bank on the anti-war mentality after Vietnam and he played the role as a prudent and cautious military leader, a move which would bring him enormous popular support and, along with it, vast political capital. On the other hand, the last minute reversal on war against Hussein also saved him from antagonizing the president, the ultimate decision-maker. 3. Powell was famously known as “the reluctant warrior” because he rarely advocated military intervention as the first solution to foreign policy crises. His reluctance to the use of force grew out of the bitter lessons the US military taken from Vietnam, which include that the war power should not be monopolized by civilian leadership, that the US military power is limited, that military force should only be used as a last resort, and that the American support for US military involvement is finite. These lessons were formalized in “the Weinberger Criteria,” a list of conditions that sought to avoid another Vietnam-quagmire by strictly regulating the application of US military force. However, the lessons the military drew from Vietnam were overly generalized or even flawed, thus making the “Weinberger Criteria” inappropriate to be the guiding principle with regard to the use of force. Powell’s insistence on the “Weinberger Criteria” only made his military advice unacceptable to political leadership and marginalized his roles in the decision-making processes of the two Persian Gulf Crises. 4. Powell was politically neutral during his career, never revealing any strong ideology or political inclination, which made him easily acceptable to most Americans, both conservatives and liberals. However, this political neutrality became his major liability when the nation faced a real security crisis posed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. His archrivals in the George W Bush’s administration, the neoconservatives, though pursued a radical military approach that stood directly opposite to the prudent “Weinberger Criteria,” had, at least, strong convictions in American traditional political ideology and ideals. In a time of crisis when strong political leadership was required, President Bush determined to choose the neoconservatives over Powell to lead foreign policy, thus leading to the downfall of one of the greatest soldier-statesmen since Eisenhower, as well as the military conservatism he embodied.
顯示於類別:	[美洲研究所] 學位論文

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