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    jsp.display-item.identifier=請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/85171

    题名: 無線電頻譜市場管制模式之探討—以頻譜財產權制度為核心
    其它题名: Review of Market Mechanisms for Spectrum
    Management with the Concept of "Spectrum Property Rights"
    作者: 林俊宏
    贡献者: 淡江大學產業經濟學系
    关键词: 無線電頻譜;頻譜經濟學;頻譜財產權;次級市場;頻譜公共性
    日期: 2008
    上传时间: 2013-04-08 15:25:36 (UTC+8)
    出版者: 臺北市:行政院公平交易委員會
    摘要: 早在十九世紀以來,無線電頻譜因其需求性及技術的發展,使如何分配頻譜以發揮最大效益的議題,一直是經濟學者及通訊科技專家所關注的焦點,也因理論的不同、實務操作的差異,各國政府於如何建立起一套完備的頻譜管制模式亦有不同的操作方式,在美國主要由政府以授權方式進行,後因技術發展,美國在1938年開始創先
    的考慮。經濟學家Ronald Coase在1959年發表一篇有關頻譜經濟學的論文,以類似財
    產權的觀點,在無線電頻譜分配及執照發放的議題上,以次級市場( Secondary Market)
    出一妥適建議。Since 1927, the electromagnetic spectrum has been allocated to uses and users by the
    governmental administration in several countries, covering radio broadcasting, television,
    satellites, police and national defense needs, among many others. By the means, assignees
    receive a license to broadcast certain material at a specified frequency and a specified
    power level and direction. For many purposes, this license is always renewed and with
    limited rights for the specified purposes. Economists since Ronald Coase (1959) have
    argued strongly and persuasively that allocating a scarce resource by administrative fiat
    makes little sense; establishing a market for spectrum, in which owners could buy, sell,
    subdivide and aggregate spectrum parcels would lead to a much more efficient allocation of
    this scarce resource. Economists had continuously pressed for "marketizing" spectrum and
    using the concept of "spectrum property rights" as the surest means to use this important
    national resource efficiently. Meanwhile, the primary obstacle to recognizing property
    rights in spectrum is either a lack of economic sophistication or political will by the relevant
    However, the transition to a property rights model for spectrum is far more complex
    than commonly portrayed. Unlike real property, radio spectrum does not allow for
    clear boundaries, as radio waves propagate in varying ways depending on a variety of
    circumstances and practical filtering constraints prevent total isolation between adjacent
    frequency bands. And most significantly, any workable system of property rights will need to
    rely on the predictive models that generally govern how spectrum is used today. It cannot be
    founded for answers that how a property rights system for spectrum would work in practice.
    It also could not simply resolved by the governmental administration to enforce property rights at the geographic boundary of a coverage area as well as at the boundaries of different
    frequency bands.
    Recently, the developers of radio technologies undermine the current system of
    administrative allocation of exclusive-use licenses, and call for an "open range," or
    commons, approach to the spectrum that would do away with exclusive use. "Removing the
    fences," in this view, will lead to more efficient use of the spectrum. While both economists
    and radio engineers believe the present system of spectrum allocation is inefficient and
    wasteful, they appear to have diametrically opposed views of what should replace it.
    Economists seek to unleash the power of the market to achieve efficient outcomes; engineers
    seek to unleash the power of the commons to achieve efficient outcomes. With such debates,
    the article questioned that this is a false dichotomy, based on a misunderstanding by some
    economists of the new radio technologies and a misunderstanding by some engineers of the
    flexibility of property rights and markets. The article argues that the concept of property
    rights in spectrum that might simultaneously support both markets and the rapid diffusion of
    the new radio technologies, leading to a far more efficient allocation of this important and
    limited national resource. However, believe that the overly simple assumptions underlying
    the claims of most property rights advocates could lead to unfortunate results and unintended
    consequences. To avoid such results, those integrating technological, economic, and legal
    expertise need to engage on the merits of a critically important policy challenge.
    關聯: 第15屆競爭政策與公平交易法學術研討會論文集,頁299-348
    显示于类别:[產業經濟學系暨研究所] 會議論文


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