| Abstract: | 早在十九世紀以來，無線電頻譜因其需求性及技術的發展，使如何分配頻譜以發揮最大效益的議題，一直是經濟學者及通訊科技專家所關注的焦點，也因理論的不同、實務操作的差異，各國政府於如何建立起一套完備的頻譜管制模式亦有不同的操作方式，在美國主要由政府以授權方式進行，後因技術發展，美國在1938年開始創先
以無須授權方式管制頻譜以來，已發展出一套無須執照政策的特殊方式來適應實際
的考慮。經濟學家Ronald Coase在1959年發表一篇有關頻譜經濟學的論文，以類似財
產權的觀點，在無線電頻譜分配及執照發放的議題上，以次級市場( Secondary Market)
之概念，認定其為頻譜分配最佳、最好的使用方法，雖然許多評論家擴張其理
論，但如何去定義使用頻譜的權利仍是有其困難性。頻譜管理應建立一個最有效率的
頻譜使用架構，且廣為各方接受，但因頻譜具有數種獨特性質使這項任務更加複雜，
適當的頻譜政策必須用以確保頻譜的有效使用，而最適的頻譜政策可能視科技狀況而
定，但頻譜使用範闇隨著時間改變，故有效率的制度必須與時調整以反應科技進展與
市場條件的改變，而頻譜管理制度透過進入成本、市場結構及私有利益等變數影響通
訊產業的演化，但即使大力推行頻譜資源市場化，頻譜管理模式仍有不同的作業型
態，這些不同的型態有不同的定義方式去選用不同的管制模式，其訂價、投資與創新
過程也不相同，由於不同方法都真有無可取代之利弊，且無單一方式能夠優於全體，
故本文希望藉由不同類型的頻譜管理模式，提供電信產業關鍵意涵的比較分析，而作
出一妥適建議。Since 1927, the electromagnetic spectrum has been allocated to uses and users by the
governmental administration in several countries, covering radio broadcasting, television,
satellites, police and national defense needs, among many others. By the means, assignees
receive a license to broadcast certain material at a specified frequency and a specified
power level and direction. For many purposes, this license is always renewed and with
limited rights for the specified purposes. Economists since Ronald Coase (1959) have
argued strongly and persuasively that allocating a scarce resource by administrative fiat
makes little sense; establishing a market for spectrum, in which owners could buy, sell,
subdivide and aggregate spectrum parcels would lead to a much more efficient allocation of
this scarce resource. Economists had continuously pressed for "marketizing" spectrum and
using the concept of "spectrum property rights" as the surest means to use this important
national resource efficiently. Meanwhile, the primary obstacle to recognizing property
rights in spectrum is either a lack of economic sophistication or political will by the relevant
policymakers.
However, the transition to a property rights model for spectrum is far more complex
than commonly portrayed. Unlike real property, radio spectrum does not allow for
clear boundaries, as radio waves propagate in varying ways depending on a variety of
circumstances and practical filtering constraints prevent total isolation between adjacent
frequency bands. And most significantly, any workable system of property rights will need to
rely on the predictive models that generally govern how spectrum is used today. It cannot be
founded for answers that how a property rights system for spectrum would work in practice.
It also could not simply resolved by the governmental administration to enforce property rights at the geographic boundary of a coverage area as well as at the boundaries of different
frequency bands.
Recently, the developers of radio technologies undermine the current system of
administrative allocation of exclusive-use licenses, and call for an "open range," or
commons, approach to the spectrum that would do away with exclusive use. "Removing the
fences," in this view, will lead to more efficient use of the spectrum. While both economists
and radio engineers believe the present system of spectrum allocation is inefficient and
wasteful, they appear to have diametrically opposed views of what should replace it.
Economists seek to unleash the power of the market to achieve efficient outcomes; engineers
seek to unleash the power of the commons to achieve efficient outcomes. With such debates,
the article questioned that this is a false dichotomy, based on a misunderstanding by some
economists of the new radio technologies and a misunderstanding by some engineers of the
flexibility of property rights and markets. The article argues that the concept of property
rights in spectrum that might simultaneously support both markets and the rapid diffusion of
the new radio technologies, leading to a far more efficient allocation of this important and
limited national resource. However, believe that the overly simple assumptions underlying
the claims of most property rights advocates could lead to unfortunate results and unintended
consequences. To avoid such results, those integrating technological, economic, and legal
expertise need to engage on the merits of a critically important policy challenge. |
