| 摘要: | 民國88年修正公平法第46條，對於公平法適用的排除，增加了「不抵觸本法立法意旨」的限制，對於此一新增限制所造成的改變有多大，是否改變了該條原來的規範功能，或者只是在原來的體制定位上，就公平法和其他經濟、社會法規的關係，做了「範圍」上的調整，有待進一步的釐清，本文之研究即是以此為範疇。公平交易法在當前經濟法制中，因其體現自由化、國際化的基本政策，及規範領域的全面性，而具有「經濟總則法」的地位，但絕非「經濟憲法」。作為處理公平交易法與其他法律衝突的機制「之一」，第46條在解釋上應將其功能單純化。而不論修正前後，這裡說的其他法律，均只限於狹義的法律，及授權範圍、目的明確的法規命令；而其排除公平法禁止規定的意旨也必須相當明確。 修正後的第46條賦予公平法執法機關「反排除」的審查權，即以公平交易法追求效能競爭的立法意旨為基準，對排除公平法禁止規定的其他法律規定，做能否相容的審查。惟基於法律位階效力相同的考量，此一審查應非單純兩法規範圍內容是否相容的「抽象審查」，對於規範內容與公平法禁止規定相反者，原則上仍不能否定其效力---不論其制定在公平法之前或之後。但公平會應就該規範的「適用」，依公平法立法意旨加以檢視，有無迴避或降低衝突的空間，換言之，本條目的在使與公平法平行的經濟、社會管制法律，儘可能朝向與公平法相容的方向操作，在不太妨礙該法目的達成的情況下，輔助公平法，或至少不影響公平法目的的達成，性質上可稱之為具體審查權。本文並建議公平會於採具體審查時，宜以(1)集中度與進入市場的障礙(2)參與競爭者與市場績效(3)市場規模(4)競爭素質(5)生產效率與配置效率(6)交易成本(7)消費者福利的基準與密度等作為審查基準的參考因素。並以(1)除外是否基於經濟因素考量(2)立法時點---先於或後於公平法(3)立法原則---有無維護競爭秩序的宣示(4)決策協商---有無公平會的參與諮詢等作為審查密度的參考因素。 公平會行使具體審查權，關鍵在於立法意旨的掌握。本法第1條雖為目的規定，但以其文字之籠統，尚難推導出較為明確的審查方向。若能回溯本法產生的社經背景，並更宏觀的透視競爭法的發展趨向，即知公平法為國際第三波競爭立法浪潮的產物，其不同於第一、二波立法之處，在於對待經濟管制的態度，當管制革新的理念與實踐幾乎席捲全球後，新一波的競爭法不再認為管制與競爭為兩種對立而不可替代的經濟領域，而是在相當程度上可以相輔相成的兩套機制，此所以修正公平法第46條的反排除設計，在標的上雖不限於各種經濟管制法，但主要考量在於調和兩者，則殊無可疑。美國最高法院在操作反托拉斯法時，有關豁免的承認與審查態度，也有相當多可以參酌之處。
To deal with the conflict between the Fair Trade Law and other Laws,Art. 46 of the amended Fair Trade Law (FTL,1999) announced that allbehaviors, authorized by the "other laws", employed by firms forcompetition are admissible only when the "other laws" are notincompatible with the legal intention of FTL. Following questions needto be answered : (1) Whether the FTL had thus become the " Constitutionof economical affairs"? (2) How to explore the legislative intentionsof the FTL ? (3) How to implement the amended Art.46 FTL from theperspective of the FTC ? we believe, the mere fact that the FTL isapplicable in almost every economic area and that it is generally heldin the era of liberalization and globalization as a model product ofthe Zeitgeist, would not raise it to the status of the EconomicConstitution. Nevertheless, the FTL represents a set of "generalrules" regarding the operation of market economy, rather thanexceptions, as most trade regulations do. The 1999 amendment of theFTL has not changed its nature and status in Taiwan's system ofeconomic law. And since Art.46 is only one of the mechanismschanneling conflicts between the FTL and "other laws", itsconstruction should not be made too much complicated. It has served asa general exemption clause to authorize the firms who have actedagainst the FTL prohibitions to call upon other laws. The new Art.46renders the FTC the power to counter intervention of other laws by theenforcement of the FTL to keep competition as effective as possible.The main task of this research lies in finding out the legislativeintentions of FTL. Since analysis of Art.1 of the FTL, the purposeclause, leads to nowhere, we have traced back to the development ofU.S and German competition laws, especially the practice of U.S.Supreme Court which have been very often referred to by the FTLlegislators. We come to the conclusion that as a result of regulatoryreform Western countries tend to implant ocmpetition element in thereformed regulation laws to make regulated markets contestable. Andnew tide of competition law in the nineties such as the FTL treatsregulation not as something anti-competitive by nature. The FTC shouldthen see that regulation laws be properly enforced, when it comes toexempt anti-competitive behaviors. Without the status of economicconstitution, Art.46 of the FTL should not be construed as a generalauthorization to declare other laws void. Rather, it equips the FTCwith the power to coordinate and balance the goals of other laws withthat of the FTL and to guard against abusing. |
