盈餘門檻、盈餘管理工具與行為之關連性

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Title:	盈餘門檻、盈餘管理工具與行為之關連性
Other Titles:	Associations of Earnings Thresholds, Earnings Management Devices and Behavior
Authors:	葉金成;陳玉婷;林凱薰
Contributors:	淡江大學會計學系
Keywords:	盈餘管理;裁決性應計項目;衍生性金融商品;盈餘門檻;earnings management;discretional accruals;derivatives;threshold
Date:	2007-09
Issue Date:	2013-01-26 23:22:21 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	臺北縣淡水鎮：淡江大學會計學系; 臺北市 : 實踐大學會計學系
Abstract:	本研究之目的在探討當實證會計理論之三假說成立時，公司的管理階層使用裁決性應計項目與衍生性金融商品進行盈餘管理之行為。本研究以「零盈餘」、「前期報導盈餘」及「分析師盈餘預測正負20%J 為門檻，實證結果發現，當紅利假說及債務契約假說成立，若操縱前盈餘在下列三種狀況: (1)高於零盈餘(2)高於前期報導盈餘及(3) 高於分析師預測盈餘正負20% 門檻時，公司的管理階層皆偏好使用裁決性應計項目來平穩化盈餘。在政治成本假說成立下，若操縱前盈餘在下列三種狀況: (1)低於零盈餘(2)低於前期報導盈餘及(3)低於分析師盈餘預測正負20% 時，公司的管理階層皆偏好使用衍生性金融商品來提高盈餘數字，以美化財務報表。企業的管理階層在考量如何權衡二種工具之使用時，會考慮自身紅利與企業績效關連性大小，實証結果發現，當管理階層對公司的持股比例越高時，越會利用裁決性應計項目來調整盈餘數字。當公司的負債比率越高時，亦會利用裁決性應計項目來操縱盈餘。當企業的規模越大，會利用衍生性金融商品來進行盈餘管理。另外，實證結果亦發現，管理階層在操縱裁決性應計項目與衍生性金融商品時，二者間確實存在替代性的關係。 Since board of directors is the core mechanism of corporate governance, this study intends to explore the quality formation for the board, in addition to further comprehend influences onto the extent of corporation earnings management. The quality of board is comprised of three layered-profiles separated as diversity, professionalism and independence. And the earnings management employs absolute value of discretionary accruals as its replacement measuring variables, in order to establish the model of measuring relationships. The major findings of this study are (1) The diversified board quality composition: earnings management variables correlates with the ratios of institution board member in a positive way, but in a negative aspect with the board's size and magnitude. (2) The quality composition of board independence: there is a positive correlation to earnings management variables if the chairman of the board holds a concurrent post of the president for that corporation. On the contrary, there is a negative correlation between earnings management variables with ratios of pledge of stock rights, in addition to independent director holding more or less concurrent post(s) of other corporation directors.
Relation:	2007年第十一屆兩岸會計與管理學術研討會「會計準則與企業價值」論文集(下冊)，頁635-660
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute & Department of Accounting] Proceeding

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