A Model of Counterfeiting: A Duopoly Approach

doi:10.1016/j.japwor.2012.06.001

淡江大學機構典藏 > 商管學院 > 產業經濟學系暨研究所 > 期刊論文 > Item 987654321/79757

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题名:	A Model of Counterfeiting: A Duopoly Approach
作者:	Tsai, Ming-Fang;Chiou, Jiunn-Rong;Lin, Chun-Hung A.
贡献者:	淡江大學經濟學系
关键词:	Vertical differentiation;Horizontal differentiation;Counterfeiting;Enforcement policy
日期:	2012-12-01
上传时间:	2013-01-10 17:45:10 (UTC+8)
出版者:	Amsterdam: Elsevier BV * North-Holland
摘要:	This paper establishes a duopoly model, which considers consumers’ preference exhibits the horizontal differentiation and vertical differentiation simultaneously, to investigate how counterfeiting affects firms’ market power and consumer's purchasing behavior. The effects of government enforcement on counterfeiting are also concerned. The findings tell that (1) the market power of the firms is higher than the one when consumers with only the characteristic of horizontal differentiation or vertical differentiation; (2) when the production cost of a genuine product increases, the consumers who originally purchased this genuine product may continue to purchase the genuine one, purchase the genuine of the other brand, or, quite interestingly, purchase the counterfeiting product of the other brand; (3) If government imposes a (stricter) enforcement on counterfeiting, the consumers who do not have a strong preference on a particular brand of product but originally purchased the counterfeit of this brand of product may instead purchase the genuine one or purchase nothing; the consumers who originally purchased its genuine may instead purchase the genuine of the other brand or purchase nothing.
關聯:	Japan and the World Economy 24(4), pp.283–291
DOI:	10.1016/j.japwor.2012.06.001
显示于类别:	[產業經濟學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

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