Counterfeiting, Enforcement and Social Welfare

機構典藏 > College of Business and Management > Graduate Institute & Department of Economics > Journal Article > Item 987654321/79756

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/79756

Title:	Counterfeiting, Enforcement and Social Welfare
Authors:	Tsai, Ming-Fang;Chiou, Jiunn-Rong
Contributors:	淡江大學經濟學系
Keywords:	Counterfeit;Enforcement;Vertical differentiation;Network externality;K42;L13
Date:	2012-09-01
Issue Date:	2013-01-10 17:42:07 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	Vienna: Springer Wien
Abstract:	This paper uses a vertical product differentiation model to discuss the influences caused by counterfeiting on prices and outputs of original products, consumer surplus and social welfare. We also explore the impact of the government’s enforcement on counterfeiting and social welfare. We find that as counterfeiting may occur, sales of the original product could either increase or decrease. The welfare effects of government enforcement are shown as follows. First, a strict enforcement on counterfeiting by government may either increase or decrease welfare. Second, when counterfeiting emerges, welfare under a stricter enforcement is not necessarily larger than that without enforcement. Last, a strict enough enforcement can still improve welfare even if there is a relatively high enforcement cost.
Relation:	Journal of Economics 107(1), pp.1-21
DOI:	10.1007/s00712-011-0249-1
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute & Department of Economics] Journal Article

Files in This Item:

File	Size	Format
Counterfeiting, Enforcement and Social Welfare.pdf	319Kb	Adobe PDF	0	View/Open
index.html	0Kb	HTML	361	View/Open
index.html	0Kb	HTML	81	View/Open