|Abstract: ||「公私夥伴關係」泛指政府與廠商之間具有共同願景與目標，並分享權威、財務與技術資源，以及風險之一種制度安排。近年來，BOT這類長期公私夥伴關係實務日漸盛行。由於公私夥伴關係這樣的組織形式正巧位居公、私領域的「模糊地帶」（the twilight zone），協力行為深受所謂的「衝突性制度邏輯」（competing in stitutional logic）影響。基此，有關公私夥伴關係治理成效之研究，若僅單純著眼於「功能主義」觀點，卻忽略來自「社會學新制度論」觀點的洞見，似乎並不適當。本文主要推論在於：有關公私夥伴關係之成功運作，促參機關與『協力廠商』之間關係固然重要，但促參機關與『外部組織』（制度支持者）之間互動也不容等閒視之」特別是從民主國家分權與制衡的角度觀之。本文試圖藉由「臺北市民生活網公私合營專案」的個案研究，闡述原先合作夥伴何以最終淪為「不情願夥伴」。個案研究結果顯示主要因素有三，分別是：兩造（1）從「權威分享」的政策宣稱，逐漸回復到公部門「權力支配」之慣性；（2）從秉持「彈性協商與相互調適」的信念，逐漸步向「裁量限縮與契約僵化」的回頭路；（3）從原先「風險移轉與風險分擔」的契約設計理念，逐漸掉入公部門只圖「風險移轉」卻「規避風險」的死胡同。這意味著支持公私夥伴關係有效運作的「聯盟－關係正當性」與公部門長期追求的「行政－法律正當性」和「社會－政治正當性」之間可能潛存衝突。因此，學界或實務界鼓吹跨部門治理之餘，不應對公、私部門之間本質衝突問題置若罔聞；更重要的是，單憑促參政策未必能夠對公共治理成效產生多大改變，「制度壓力」影響夥伴關係治理的問題，必須獲得正視。|
“Public-private partnerships (PPPs)” refer to an institutional arrangement of having common vision and goal, and sharing of authority, financial and technical resources, and even risks between the government and the firm. Long-term PPPs practices such as BOT has been prevailing in recent years. Actually, since the form of an organization such as PPPs locates on “the twilight zone” between the public and private sphere, collaborative behaviors would be affected by the so-called “competing institutional logic”. It seems, therefore, inadequately to do this kind of study solely from the viewpoint of “functionalism”, while neglecting the insights provided by the viewpoint of “the new institutionalism in sociology”. The author would like to argue that “the relationship between the public sector and the private sector is crucial, but the relationship between the public sector and the other institutional constituents also should not be disregarded”, especially from the perspective of separation of powers and checks and balances issues in democracy. Through the case study of “My Taipei Website PPPs Project”, the author intends to explore the reason why partners working together eventually became “the reluctant partners“.
The findings designated that the operation of PPPs was (a) from the original policy claims of “authority sharing” return to the bureaucratic inertia of “power dominance”; (b) from the belief of “flexible negotiation and mutual adjustment” return to the bureaucratic habits of “discretion self-shrinking and contract rigidity”; (c) from the ideas of “risk-shifting and risk-sharing” return to the bureaucratic tradition of enjoying the “risk-shifting” while disregarding “risk-sharing”. Accordingly, it is recommended that the “alliance-relational legitimacy” supporting the operation of successful PPPs seems to potentially conflict with the “administrative-legal legitimacy” and “social-political legitimacy” pursued, for a long time, by the public sector. Thus, the topic of the cross-sector governance advocated by scholars and practitioners, interest conflicts between the public and private sector should be considered.
Plus, it would be naively to expect that the Promotion Participation Policy would have
significant effects on the outcome of public governance, unless the fact that “institutional
pressures” might influence the governance in PPPs is also seriously concerned.