淡江大學機構典藏:Item 987654321/78207
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Items with full text/Total items : 62805/95882 (66%)
Visitors : 3986782      Online Users : 515
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library & TKU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
    •  Adv. Search
    Home ‧ Login ‧ Upload ‧ Help ‧ About ‧ Administer Goto mobile version


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/78207


    Title: Counterfeiting and Consumer's Decision: A Duopoly Approach
    Authors: Tsai, Ming-fang;Chiou, Jiunn-rong;Lin, Chun-hung A.
    Contributors: 淡江大學產業經濟學系
    Keywords: Vertical differentiation;Horizontal differentiation;Counterfeiting;Enforcement policy
    Date: 2009
    Issue Date: 2012-09-12 17:51:55 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: Taipei: Department of Industrial Economics, Tamkang University
    Abstract: This paper establishes a duopoly model which considers the horizontal differentiation and vertical differentiation simultaneously to investigate the changes in consumer's purchasing behavior in presence of counterfeiting. We fmd that as the price of one brand of a genuine product decreases due to the emergence of its counterfeit, the consumers who have a high loyalty to the brand of product could instead purchase the counterfeiting one, but consumers who do not have a strong preference on the brand of product could show their interests in the genuine one. As far as government enforcement is concerned, we fmd the following interesting results. First, with government enforcement on a particular counterfeit, the consumers who iliow no strong preference on a particular brand and also originally purchased the counterfeit could instead go to purchase its genuine product or purchase nothing but not possibly continue to purchase the counterfeit. Second, for those consumers who originally purchased a genuine product, a more rigorous government monitoring rate on its counterfeit could lead to three more possibilities: purchase the genuine product of the other brand, purchase nothing or, quite interestingly, purchase the counterfeit of the other brand of genuine product.
    Relation: 2009 International Conference on Trade, Industrial and Regional Economics, 35pages
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of Industrial Economics] Proceeding

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat
    index.html0KbHTML259View/Open

    All items in 機構典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library & TKU Library IR teams. Copyright ©   - Feedback