歐債危機形成根本因素，可以歸因於EMU的組成結構。1991年簽署的馬斯垂克條約中，歐盟會員國僅願意讓渡貨幣政策主權，雖然會員國政府保有財政政策主權，在缺乏貨幣政策工具協助下，會員國必須進行包含勞力市場、就業等結構改革，提升國內經濟體質。在會員國尚未同意讓渡財政政策主權至歐盟的情形下，僅依靠各國政策協調意願的財政監督機制，無法針對會員國財政進行有效控管與制裁。 面對債信危機帶來的負面衝擊，歐盟唯有建立財政同盟，才能根本解決歐元區內經濟發展歧異的情形，使貨幣同盟得以穩定發展。在當前債信危機下，歐元區的經濟前景受到嚴重的負面影響，迫使歐盟各國領導人正視貨幣同盟缺乏深度經濟整合的問題，便是建立與貨幣同盟相佐的財政同盟，而建立財政同盟也表示會員國需要將部分必要財政主權讓渡至歐盟機構。不論未來歐盟會員國將以何種形式改革，唯有建立財政同盟才能根本解決歐元區目前財政與貨幣政策無法互補的缺陷。 European debt crisis can be resulted from the structure of EMU. In Maastricht Treaty negotiation in 1991, the member states were willing to concede only the sovereignty of monetary policy to EU. Though the member states hold the fiscal sovereignty in their hand, they should undertake structural reform including labor market, employment and etc. to reinforce the economic structure in lacking of monetary instruments. It is undeniable that the without member states’ willing to transfer further fiscal competences to EU, the peer-pressure based fiscal surveillance framework in Eurozone would not be effective. The only way for EU to deal with the sovereign debt crisis is to establish a fiscal union in which the fiscal transfer mechanism can help those member states in difficulty to pay their debt and engage in structural reform. A effective fiscal union can make the monetary union function smoothly and successfully, thus to secure the stability of Euro. In front of the impact of the crisis, the leaders of EU member states are forced to face the imperfection of EMU structure, to set up a fiscal union means that they have to yield more competences to EU to create a fiscal union on which a well-functioned monetary union should based. In a nutshell, no matter how the EU member states decide to reform the EMU, only an effective fiscal union can fix up the defect of monetary union without fiscal backup.