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|Other Titles: ||A research on the negotiations of cross-strait fisherman labor severice cooperation|
|Authors: ||李庚餘;Li, Keng-Yu|
|Keywords: ||兩岸關係;漁船船員;雙層賽局理論;協商談判;國內因素;Cross-strait Relations;Fisherman Labor;Two-Level Game Theory;Negotiations;The National Level|
|Issue Date: ||2012-06-21 06:52:36 (UTC+8)|
In view of the fact regarding the change of political atmosphere as well as ever increasing economic and trade exchange across the Taiwan strait, the study of negotiation strategy during each stage across the strait is found with referential value both in terms of academic deliberation and policy planning. For such perspective, the purpose of this study is to explore cooperation negotiation strategy on labor service of fishery industry across the strait through the model of “Two-Level Game Theory”, and it will then be based on to elaborate and interpret the development and evolution of labor service cooperation on fishery industry across the Taiwan strait.
The study is divided into four parts.At the first part, it discusses about the consultation and negotiation structure derived from negotiation process and special political environment across the Taiwan strait, which includes the stages of period during martial law, time of opening period, and the shift of ruling political party, and it delineates the negotiation process and general situation during each stage. The second part includes a correlation analysis conducted to investigate the external and internal factors that impact negotiations across the strait. At the third part, the study analyzes the evolution and historical development of the fishery labor system of Taiwan and China to state the development of stages from Non-governmental negotiation to dual-commission mechanism and then to the current measure of negotiation predominated by the government. It clearly analyzes the part of their differences, and studies the application of the attitude and strategy adopted in labor service cooperation of fishery industry in Taiwan and China. At the end, the study puts forth conclusions for all of the discussions, and proposes suggestions for further research in the future regarding related issues aside from bringing forth important research findings.
The study has found that two-level game theory can combine the feature of conducting observation on domestic factors in Taiwan and China at the same time, and it is truly conducive to researchers as they observe and interpret the dynamic processes of labor service cooperation on fishery industry across the Taiwan strait. However, conducting some partial adjustment on the research model put forth by Putnam based on the particular political conditions between the Taiwan strait will surely be a thinkings principles of observes the future development of cross-strait relations.
|Appears in Collections:||[中國大陸研究所] 學位論文|
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