鑑於兩岸政治氛圍的轉變與經貿交流的日益頻繁，研究兩岸各階段談判策略實有學術討論與政策規劃上的參考價值。對此，本文旨在透過「雙層賽局理論」之模型，探討兩岸漁業勞務合作談判策略，並據以描述與解釋兩岸漁業勞務合作之發展與演進。文章共分為四個部分，首先是兩岸談判的歷程與特殊政治環境下所衍生的協商談判架構，包含戒嚴時期、開放時其乃至於經歷政黨輪替階段，敘述各階段談判過程與概況；其次為做分析比對，並探討影響兩岸談判的外在因素與內在因素；第三部分則是分析兩岸發展大陸漁船船員制度的演進與歷史沿革，敘述由民間協商轉為複委託機制乃至於現今官方主導談判的方式，明確分析其不同所在，並研究分析大陸與台灣對於兩岸漁業勞務合作所採取的態度與策略的應用；最後總結本文所有討論，除提出重要研究發現，亦將針對相關議題提出未來研究建議。研究發現，雙層賽局理論同時結合大陸與國內因素進行觀察的特性，確實有助於研究者觀察並解釋兩岸漁業勞務合作的動態過程，但基於兩岸特殊的政治現狀，針對普特南所提出之研究模型進行部分調整，將是觀察兩岸關係未來發展時的重要思考方向。 Abstract In view of the fact regarding the change of political atmosphere as well as ever increasing economic and trade exchange across the Taiwan strait, the study of negotiation strategy during each stage across the strait is found with referential value both in terms of academic deliberation and policy planning. For such perspective, the purpose of this study is to explore cooperation negotiation strategy on labor service of fishery industry across the strait through the model of “Two-Level Game Theory”, and it will then be based on to elaborate and interpret the development and evolution of labor service cooperation on fishery industry across the Taiwan strait. The study is divided into four parts.At the first part, it discusses about the consultation and negotiation structure derived from negotiation process and special political environment across the Taiwan strait, which includes the stages of period during martial law, time of opening period, and the shift of ruling political party, and it delineates the negotiation process and general situation during each stage. The second part includes a correlation analysis conducted to investigate the external and internal factors that impact negotiations across the strait. At the third part, the study analyzes the evolution and historical development of the fishery labor system of Taiwan and China to state the development of stages from Non-governmental negotiation to dual-commission mechanism and then to the current measure of negotiation predominated by the government. It clearly analyzes the part of their differences, and studies the application of the attitude and strategy adopted in labor service cooperation of fishery industry in Taiwan and China. At the end, the study puts forth conclusions for all of the discussions, and proposes suggestions for further research in the future regarding related issues aside from bringing forth important research findings. The study has found that two-level game theory can combine the feature of conducting observation on domestic factors in Taiwan and China at the same time, and it is truly conducive to researchers as they observe and interpret the dynamic processes of labor service cooperation on fishery industry across the Taiwan strait. However, conducting some partial adjustment on the research model put forth by Putnam based on the particular political conditions between the Taiwan strait will surely be a thinkings principles of observes the future development of cross-strait relations.