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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/77350

    Title: 訊息不對稱下R&D的嚇阻效果
    Other Titles: The effect of R&D on deterring entry under asymmetric information
    Authors: 顏佩珊;Yen, Pei-Shan
    Contributors: 淡江大學產業經濟學系碩士班
    陳宜亨;Chen, Yi-Heng
    Keywords: 雙占;完全訊息;不對稱性;Cournot競爭;Duopoly;Perfect Information;Asymmetric Information;Cournot Competition;R&D
    Date: 2012
    Issue Date: 2012-06-21 06:35:59 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文建立一個只有兩家廠商的雙占模型,主要參考Creane and Miyagiwa (2009)的文章,考慮廠商成本訊息完全以及訊息不對稱下,在研發會發生成本的假設下,既存廠商的研發策略是否為有效的阻嚇進入策略。
    Based on Creane and Miyagiwa (2009), this paper builds up a simple duopoly model under perfect and asymmetric information on production costs. We want to find that the effect of R&D on deterring entry when R&D strategy incurs cost.
    We find that R&D is not an effectively entry-deterring strategy. Both in perfect and asymmetric information, if the incumbent adopts R&D strategy, it will accommodate the entrant to obtain a higher profit.
    Also, when the incumbent has high production cost, using R&D and accommodating new entrant will be a better strategy both in perfect and asymmetric information. However, when the incumbent has low cost, giving up R&D to stay being monopoly will be the best choice in perfect information situation. While in asymmetric information, the incumbent should give up R&D and stay in monopoly when its production cost is at the middle level, and should choose R&D and accommodate entrant when its production cost is at the very low level.
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of Industrial Economics] Thesis

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