存款保險制度是金融安全網之一環，然而該制度有其爭議性。當政府對金融機構存款提供一定程度保障時，存款人對金融機構風險承擔程度的敏感度也會同時降低，尤其保障額度過高甚至全額保障時更是如此。 本文透過檢測自2003年第1季至2011年第2季間，本國銀行、信用合作社與農、漁會信用部之存款變動率及存款利率資料進行Panal Data分析，觀察我國金融市場內是否有存款人制約效果，以及存款保險保障額度改變是否會影響存款人制約效果，實證結果簡要如下： 1.依各類金融機構之風險指標對存款變動率及存款利率之影響檢測，我國金融市場內存在存款人制約效果。 2.對銀行及信用合作社，獲利能力是最顯著指標，另金融海嘯後，資本適足性之顯著性提高。 3.存款人對於存放比率高之農漁會信用部要求較高之存款利率，此或顯示存款人對於農漁會信用部是否有足夠能力善用存款資金有一定疑慮。 4.我國民眾對本國銀行有太大而不會倒(too big to fail)的心態。 Deposit insurance policy is a member of financial safety net, but it is contentious. Depositors would reduce sensitivity for the risk of financial institutions, when government offer certain amount of indemnity to depositor’s deposit saving in financial institutions, in particular of the amount being too much or FULL. This study examine the growth rate and the price of deposits on a sample of 23 banks, 25 credit cooperatives, and 276 credit departments of farmer’s and fishermen’s associations in Taiwan during the 1st season of 2003 to 2nd season of 2011 to measure whether depositor discipline has effective effect and the impact of these regulatory changes on depositor discipline in a panel data methodology. According to the empirical results, depositor discipline effect exists in Taiwan financial institutions. Profitability is a good indicator to predict depositor discipline for banks and credit cooperatives. BIS ratio is another good one after financial tsunami. To credit departments of farmer’s and fishermen’s associations with high loan/deposit ratio, depositors would require higher interest rate, due to mistrust that they own the ability to manage deposit fund well probably. Most people believe there is a too-big-to-fail policy.
