The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act: optimal interest margin effects of commercial bank expansion into insurance underwriting

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Title:	The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act: optimal interest margin effects of commercial bank expansion into insurance underwriting
Authors:	Lin, Jyh-Horng;Tsai, Jeng-Yan;Huang, Paichou
Contributors:	淡江大學國際企業學系
Keywords:	insurance underwriting;bank interest margin;Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act
Date:	2012
Issue Date:	2012-06-11 09:47:29 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	Abingdon: Routledge
Abstract:	We examine the optimal bank interest margin effects of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA), particularly allowing commercial banks to engage in insurance underwriting. This article models bank equity explicitly integrating the Down-and-Out Call (DOC) option of insurance underwriting with the standard call option of commercial banking activities. We conclude that commercial banks may not appear to benefit from broader product mix when the expansion of insurance underwriting is relatively large scale or insurance asset quality is relatively low.
Relation:	Applied Economics Letters 19(15), pp.1459-1463
DOI:	10.1080/13504851.2011.633884
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute & Department of International Business] Journal Article

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