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    题名: A manufacturer’s optimal quantity discount and return policy through game-theoretic approach again
    作者: Chang, Shu-hui;Pao, Shih-heng
    贡献者: 淡江大學國際企業學系
    关键词: Game Theory;Quantity Discount;Returns Policy;Pareto Efficiency;Channel Coordination
    日期: 2010-03
    上传时间: 2012-05-25 11:50:07 (UTC+8)
    出版者: Taipei : Graduate Institute of Management Science, Tamkang University
    摘要: This paper utilizes a three-stage game model to discuss the establishment of channel coordination with quantity discount strategy, or together with returns policy. We explore the range of participation condition under circumstances that manufacturer has attained channel coordination by purchase discount or together with returns policy. This paper finds that even retailer further asks manufacturer for return of goods, the implementation of the returns policy would not affect the expected profit of channel members and the whole channel, because the higher the return price is, the higher the wholesale price, i.e. the purchase discount will be lesser. Even buyback price exceeds a limit leads to negative purchase discount; this paper also gets the condition resulting in negative purchase discount. In addition, when purchase discount is set, the stricter the participation condition is, the lower the buyback price that manufacturer gives to retailer. If maintenance of positive purchase discount is desired, once the stricter the participation condition for retailer given by manufacturer is, the lower the buyback price that manufacturer gives to retailer. From the participation condition, we build the optimal wholesale price that makes channel coordination and Pareto efficiency surely co-exist.
    關聯: International Journal of Information and Management Science 21(1), pp.73-90
    显示于类别:[國際企業學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

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