English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  全文筆數/總筆數 : 51254/86278 (59%)
造訪人次 : 8000841      線上人數 : 98
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library & TKU Library IR team.
搜尋範圍 查詢小技巧:
  • 您可在西文檢索詞彙前後加上"雙引號",以獲取較精準的檢索結果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜尋,建議至進階搜尋限定作者欄位,可獲得較完整資料
  • 進階搜尋
    請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/77066


    題名: A manufacturer’s optimal quantity discount and return policy through game-theoretic approach again
    作者: Chang, Shu-hui;Pao, Shih-heng
    貢獻者: 淡江大學國際企業學系
    關鍵詞: Game Theory;Quantity Discount;Returns Policy;Pareto Efficiency;Channel Coordination
    日期: 2010-03
    上傳時間: 2012-05-25 11:50:07 (UTC+8)
    出版者: Taipei : Graduate Institute of Management Science, Tamkang University
    摘要: This paper utilizes a three-stage game model to discuss the establishment of channel coordination with quantity discount strategy, or together with returns policy. We explore the range of participation condition under circumstances that manufacturer has attained channel coordination by purchase discount or together with returns policy. This paper finds that even retailer further asks manufacturer for return of goods, the implementation of the returns policy would not affect the expected profit of channel members and the whole channel, because the higher the return price is, the higher the wholesale price, i.e. the purchase discount will be lesser. Even buyback price exceeds a limit leads to negative purchase discount; this paper also gets the condition resulting in negative purchase discount. In addition, when purchase discount is set, the stricter the participation condition is, the lower the buyback price that manufacturer gives to retailer. If maintenance of positive purchase discount is desired, once the stricter the participation condition for retailer given by manufacturer is, the lower the buyback price that manufacturer gives to retailer. From the participation condition, we build the optimal wholesale price that makes channel coordination and Pareto efficiency surely co-exist.
    關聯: International Journal of Information and Management Science 21(1), pp.73-90
    顯示於類別:[國際企業學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

    文件中的檔案:

    檔案 描述 大小格式瀏覽次數
    index.html0KbHTML84檢視/開啟

    在機構典藏中所有的資料項目都受到原著作權保護.

    TAIR相關文章

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library & TKU Library IR teams. Copyright ©   - 回饋