English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Items with full text/Total items : 52068/87197 (60%)
Visitors : 8905675      Online Users : 308
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library & TKU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/77066

    Title: A manufacturer’s optimal quantity discount and return policy through game-theoretic approach again
    Authors: Chang, Shu-hui;Pao, Shih-heng
    Contributors: 淡江大學國際企業學系
    Keywords: Game Theory;Quantity Discount;Returns Policy;Pareto Efficiency;Channel Coordination
    Date: 2010-03
    Issue Date: 2012-05-25 11:50:07 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: Taipei : Graduate Institute of Management Science, Tamkang University
    Abstract: This paper utilizes a three-stage game model to discuss the establishment of channel coordination with quantity discount strategy, or together with returns policy. We explore the range of participation condition under circumstances that manufacturer has attained channel coordination by purchase discount or together with returns policy. This paper finds that even retailer further asks manufacturer for return of goods, the implementation of the returns policy would not affect the expected profit of channel members and the whole channel, because the higher the return price is, the higher the wholesale price, i.e. the purchase discount will be lesser. Even buyback price exceeds a limit leads to negative purchase discount; this paper also gets the condition resulting in negative purchase discount. In addition, when purchase discount is set, the stricter the participation condition is, the lower the buyback price that manufacturer gives to retailer. If maintenance of positive purchase discount is desired, once the stricter the participation condition for retailer given by manufacturer is, the lower the buyback price that manufacturer gives to retailer. From the participation condition, we build the optimal wholesale price that makes channel coordination and Pareto efficiency surely co-exist.
    Relation: International Journal of Information and Management Science 21(1), pp.73-90
    Appears in Collections:[國際企業學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat

    All items in 機構典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library & TKU Library IR teams. Copyright ©   - Feedback