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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/76809

    Title: Can Corporate Governance Discipline Opportunistic Earnings Management during IPO Process?
    Authors: Tang, Hui-wen
    Contributors: 淡江大學保險學系
    Keywords: corporate governance;opportunistic earnings management;family control;initial public offerings;IPOs;stock performance;revenue management;long–run stock returns;Taiwan;discretionary current accruals;post–issue stock performance;accrual management;accounting discretion;family firms
    Date: 2012-01-01
    Issue Date: 2012-05-19 07:48:55 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: Inderscience Publishers
    Abstract: This study investigates whether corporate governance can discipline opportunistic earnings management during IPO process and thus enhance long-run stock returns. Using a sample of IPOs in Taiwan, the study shows that there is a negative relation between pre-IPO discretionary current accruals (DCA) and post-issue stock performance. These findings suggest that though corporate managers might mislead the market by accrual management during IPO process, such as accelerating the recognition of revenues or deferring expenses, issuers cannot always manipulate accounting discretion to sustain their earnings. Most importantly, the results of the study demonstrate that corporate governance can deter the abuse of accounting discretion during IPO process, and thus reduce potential losses of investors who were temporarily deceived by opportunistic earnings management. Notably, in family-controlled firms, increasing institutional ownership or the presence of venture capitalists will aggravate stock reversal due to earnings management, which is different from the supervising effect on non-family controlled firms.
    Relation: International Journal of Revenue Management 6(3/4), pp.199-220
    DOI: 0.1504/IJRM.2012.050384
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of Insurance Insurance] Journal Article

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