長久以來，景氣波動一直都是經濟學者關注的焦點，本計畫的目的在於討論租稅逃避 行為與政府預算平衡對於內生性景氣波動現象可能產生的影響。本計畫包括兩個子計 畫，子計畫一企圖將Chen (2003, Review of Dynamic Economics)的租稅逃避這個觀念引 進Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997, Jorunal of Political Economy)的分析模型之中，由於租 稅逃避行為與民眾所面對的租稅環境有關，當民眾面對的稅率愈高時，逃稅行為也將 會變的更佳猖獗。因此當租稅逃避行為納入Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997)與Gou and Harrison (2004, Journal of Economic Therory)的分析模型之後，對於分析模型最直接的影 響就是政府預算限制條件。在Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997)與Gou and Harrison (1994) 的分析架構之下，當景氣熱絡時，政府租稅收入提高，為了維持預算平衡，政府將會 採取一個降低所得稅的動作，但所得稅率一旦降低，則民眾的所得稅申報比率將會提 高，因此反而會使得政府的收入提高。因此，當租稅逃避行為納入考量時，多重收斂 路徑的區間將會產生變化，我們當然有足夠的理由懷疑Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) 結果之頑強性了。子計畫二企圖將環境污染這項特質納入Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997)的架構之中，並據此討論當政府以相關的環境政策(包括污染稅與防治污染支出) 做為維持預算平衡的工具時，對於景氣循環現象可能產生的影響。 Indeterminacy potentially indicates that agents’ expectations concerning the future can be self-fulfilling and as a result, the so-called ‘animal spirits’ may generate business cycle fluctuations without any change in economic fundamentals. This creates a room for Keynesian-type stabilization to insulate the economy from belief-driven fluctuations. This project contains two parts. The first part, I tries to incorporate the role of tax evasion proposed by Chen (2003, Review of Dynamic Economics) into Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997, Journal of Political Economy) and Gou and Harrison (2004, Journal of Economic Theory) framework. By using such a framework, I try to study the role tax evasion in affecting the economic dynamic properties. In the second part, I try to incorporate the environmental pollution into Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) model, and use it to discuss the role of balance budget rule in affecting the properties of economic dynamic.
