|摘要: ||實証數據資料指出跨國授權在國際貿易中占有重要的角色，並且許多開發中國家在 鼓勵跨國授權的同時，仍然維持對外國進口商品課徵關稅。因此，存在空間及貿易障 礙下，跨國技術授權是重要且普遍存在的現象。其次，傳統的授權文獻大多假設授權 廠商擁有一個可使邊際生產成本降低的製程創新的技術，鮮少考慮到授權廠商擁有可 生產新產品的產品創新技術。產品創新包括二種：一為水平異質，二為垂直 (品質) 異 質的產品創新。在現實生活中，我們觀察到具備水平異質特性的產品創新非常普遍， 例如對傳統中式餐飲而言，麥當勞速食漢堡為一具水平異質特性的產品。再者，我們 也觀察到具備垂直異質特性的產品創新也非常普遍，例如Android 軟體可使具水平異 質特性之手機的品質提升為智慧型手機。 就授權策略及授權家數而言，Rostoker (1984) 的研究顯示，有 39% 的授權案為單 位權利金授權，13%為固定權利金授權，46%為混合授權。Caballero-Sanz et al. (2005) 的 研究指出，約有50% 的授權案為獨家授權，而另50%為非獨家授權。 根據以上分析，本研究計畫為一個三年期的計畫，分別研究下列三項議題：一、存 在空間及貿易障礙下，若授權廠商為產業內廠商，擁有一個可降低邊際生產成本的技 術，且與被授權廠商在市場從事 Cournot 競争，探討授權廠商的最適跨國授權策略； 二、若授權廠商為產業外廠商，擁有一個具備水平直異質特性的新產品的技術創新， 探討授權廠商的最適授權策略及授權家數；三、若授權廠商為產業外廠商，擁有一個 可使水平異質產品提升品質水準的技術創新，探討授權廠商的最適授權策略及授權家 數。|
Quantitative figures show that transnational licensing is significance in international trade. Kabiraj and Marjit (2003) argue that, until 1991, many developing countries were observed to have encouraged innovation licensing, while maintaining tariffs on foreign products. Hence, transnational technology licensing in the presence of trade barriers, such as transportation costs and tariffs, is crucial and commonly exists in practical applications. Next, most of the traditional licensing literature examines the case where innovation is a cost-reducing process innovation. Fewer of them explores the case where the innovation is a product innovation allowing the licensee to produce a new differentiated product. This kind of product innovation consists of horizontal and vertical differentiation. We find that the product innovation having the characteristic of horizontal differentiation commonly exist in the real world. For example, in contrast with the traditional Chinese foods, the McDonald’s fast foods are horizontally differentiated products. Moreover, we observe that product innovation having the characteristic of vertical differentiation is also frequently found in the real world. A fine example is the innovation of Android, which can upgrade mobile phones to a more advanced quality level. In regard to the licensing contracts and the number of licenses selected by the patentee, the survey of firms by Rostoker (1984) shows that royalties alone account for 39 percent, fixed fees alone for 13 percent, and royalties plus fixed fees for 46 percent. Moreover, Caballero-Sanz et al. (2005) refer to the survey report published by the Association of University Technology Managers Licensing (AUTM, 2001) which states that about half of the licenses are exclusive, while the other half non-exclusive. These figures demonstrate that, in the real world, not only are fixed-fee, royalty and mixed licensing contract popularly selected by the patentee, but the patent license may also be issued either exclusively or non-exclusively. Based on the above analysis, this project spans three years. In the first year, we examine the optimal transnational licensing contract and the optimal number of licenses in the presence of spatial and trade barriers for an insider patentee, who owns a cost-reducing process innovation, when firms engage in Cournot competition in the market. In the second year, we explore the optimal licensing contract and the optimal number of licenses for an outsider patentee, who has a product innovation characterized by horizontal differentiation, when firms engage in Cournot competition in the market. In the last year, we study the optimal licensing contract and the optimal number of licenses for an outsider patentee, who has a product innovation enabling to enhance the quality level of horizontally differentiated products, when firms engage in Cournot competition in the market.