家族企業的經營方式盛行於許多發展中與新興的國家。而根據家族企業的過去文 獻，一般認為存在兩大理論來說明家族持股對於公司績效與價值之影響。代理理論傾向 家族企業通常存在任用親信並將公司當作自身便利所用，而造成低效率與績效不佳的情 況，因此當利用薪酬來激勵經理人，反而會造成管理者領取超額薪酬，但公司績效不佳 的負向激勵效果存在。而管家理論則認為家族經理人會視公司如自身的擴展，將主動地 為公司謀求價值或績效的提升，因此不需過多的薪酬亦能達成高績效，薪酬激勵效果為 中立的。因此，本研究依據家族企業文獻的兩大理論，分析重要的家族企業特性(家族 持股、家族積極性管理與監理)是否影響高階經理人超額薪酬的激勵效果，此外，在薪 酬型態上，過去研究顯示權益薪酬相較於現金薪酬，更可降低管理者與股束的利益衝 突，有效減少代理問題，因此本研究亦針對不同的薪酬特性分析家族企業對於高階經理 人超額薪酬的激勵效果是否存在差異。 The operation form of a family business prevails over many developing and emerging countries. In general, there are two different theoretical perspectives illustrated that family ownership have an effect on the firm performance and value based the earlier literature of family business. The agency theory trends to explain that the cronyism exists in family firm and family members treat firm to their own benefit. As a result, these firms are likely inefficient and underperforming. Top managers having excess compensation is associated with firm poor performance by using incentive pay. The effect of incentive pay is negative. However, family managers view the firm as an extension of themselves and automatically pursue the advances of firm value and performance in stewardship theory. They need fewer compensation-based incentives to meet well performance. Thus, the effect of incentive pay is neutral. Based the two different theories of family business, this study analyzes whether the incentive effect on top managers excess pay is influenced by the important characteristics of family business including family ownership, family management, and family control. In addition, pass studies address that the equity based compensation can more prevent the interest conflict between owners and managers and reduce agency problem than cash based compensation. We also examine whether the incentive effect on top managers excess pay is influenced by the difference in type of pay.