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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/75612

    Title: 法院在公共政策上所扮演的角色 : 以電信法規為例
    Other Titles: The role of courts in regulatory policy: The case of telecommunications regulation
    Authors: 陳銘祥;Chen, Ming-siang
    Contributors: 淡江大學公共行政學系
    Date: 1996-01
    Issue Date: 2012-04-05 12:34:28 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: University of Illinois at Urbana-champaign(美國伊利諾大學香檳校區政治學)
    Abstract: Courts involve in regulatory policy by means of statutory judicial review, and a
    theory of statutory judicial review is needed to account for judicial behavior in
    this respect. The theory this essay presents structures statutory judicial review
    as a game in which players try to materialize their motives as much as
    possible. The ultimate outcome of this game depends on courts' strategic
    choices made under constraints imposed by their motives and other players'
    strategic choices. The theory is verified by applying to a dozen cases regarding
    a policy area characterized by massive judicial intervention, namely, the
    telecommunications regulation.
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of Public Administration] Thesis

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