| 摘要: | 論及公司治理，研究主軸多傾向公司績效，本研究意圖將公司治理與財務危機連結以探討1、有效執行公司治理，是否得以降低發生財務危機的機率。2、公司治理對於財務危機是否具有預測效果。本研究排除金融證劵業後，選取所有上市（櫃）公司且研究期間為2003-2010年。實證結果發現，一、獨立董監事占董事會席次比例愈低、董事會規模愈大、董監事股權質押比率愈高、董監事股權質押權責偏離程度愈大、資訊揭露程度愈為薄弱、會計師選任愈不嚴謹，未來三年內，企業落入財務危機的機率愈高。二、針對獨立董監事進一步測試，研究指出獨立董監事比率愈高，愈不容易落入財務危機；但當獨立董監事高於一定比率將愈容易落入財務危機。三、董事長兼任總經理與否對財務危機的影響會受到總經理持股比率所干擾。四、本研究後續分析中發現：1在董事長兼任總經理狀況下，隨著總經理持股比率增加會因利益共存而降低公司發生財務危機。2、本研究也擬出後三年中，各單一年度的共同指標，如獨立董監事比率愈低、董事會規模愈大、董監事股權質押權責偏離程度愈高與會計師選任嚴謹度愈差，企業落入財務危機的機率愈高。
Studies usually focus on the mechanism of corporate governance and its effect on corporate performance. This study intends to link corporate governance and its effect on financial crisis, we discuss: 1. Will the probability of financial crisis reduced by performing effective corporate governance? 2. Whether corporate governance can be a predicting factor of financial crisis? The sample includes all listed (OTC) companies but excludes financial / securities industry due to their characteristic. The empirical evidence is collected from 2003 to 2010, showing that: First, low proportion of independent directors and supervisors, large board size, high ratio of directors and supervisors' pledging shares, high right diverges from duty of pledging directors and supervisors' shares, low extent of information disclosure, less rigorous of the electing of external auditor, may increase the probability for corporation to fall into financial crisis within three years. Second, There is an inverted U-shaped relation between proportion of independent directors and financial crisis. Third, The general manager's shareholding ratio has intervention effect in the relationship between the duality identities of general manager/director to financial crisis. Forth, through sensitivity analysis, we found: 1. If the duality identities of general manager/director exit, the probability of financial crisis will be reduced through increasing shareholding rate of the general manager. 2. This research identified four common corporate governance variables, such as the low proportion of independent directors and supervisors, large board size, high right diverges from duty of pledging directors and supervisors' shares, and less rigorous of the electing of external auditor can be signals of corporate financial crises. |
