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    Title: 政治關係對會計師事務所選擇之影響 : 中國上市公司之實證
    Other Titles: Political connection and auditor choice : evidence from China
    Authors: 林之嵐;Lin, Chih-Lan
    Contributors: 淡江大學會計學系碩士班
    孔繁華;徐志順
    Keywords: 會計師事務所選擇;政治關係;國有企業;政商關聯;股權分置改革;中國;Auditor choice;Political Connection;State-owned enterprises;Politically-connected CEOs;Split-share structure reform;China
    Date: 2011
    Issue Date: 2011-12-28 18:22:08 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 由於社會經濟及股權分置等制度環境影響,中國上市公司多屬國有企業的性質,因此這些公司的營運決策容易受政治因素所影響,亦造成公司和政府之間存在著密切的政治關聯性。而中國早期為確保會計師事務所的品質,要求事務所必須掛靠在地方政府或是學術單位之下,造成其業務活動和市場佔有率亦與政治關係密不可分。這樣的中國審計市場特色,提供一個檢視企業政治關係與會計師事務所選擇的機會。本研究以中國2003至2009年在上海及深圳證券交易所上市的A股公司為樣本進行分析。資料來源為國泰安 (CSMAR)、台灣經濟新報 (TEJ)資料庫及中國註冊會計師協會,採用邏輯斯迴歸模型,測試樣本期間內中國上市公司政治關係對會計師事務所選擇之影響,並利用政商關聯、國有企業及國有股持股比率做為政治關係的替代變數,預期政治關聯度高的公司,可利用其政治關係優先取得投資與融資機會,所以企業對於雇用高品質的會計師事務所來顯示其高資訊品質的訊號需求就會降低。實證結果發現國有股及法人股持股比率愈高及股權制衡程度愈大的公司,愈會選擇前十大會計師事務所。然而具有政商關聯的公司,對外部人已傳遞一種無形保證,因此降低選擇十大會計師事務所的誘因。此外,由於中央國有企業的最終控股人係透過層層的控制鏈控制公司,為降低代理成本,較會選擇前十大會計師事務所。地方國有企業較仰賴地方會計師事務所與地方政府的密切關係與專業的地方知識,較不會選擇前十大會計師事務所。額外測試以修正式審計意見為審計品質之代理變數,實證結果顯示中國十大會計師事務所較會出具修正式審計意見,審計品質較高。
    This study investigates the incremental effects of corporate political connections on auditor choice, examining data of Chinese listed companies which are listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2003 to 2009. For reasons of socioeconomic conditions and separation of ownership, a majority of the publicly traded Chinese companies are state-owned and their business operations are subject to political elements. The special characteristics of audit market in China provide an opportunity to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the auditor choice. State-owned enterprises and companies run by politically-connected CEOs are expected more likely to hire small auditors. This auditor choice pattern is likely to be explained by a lesser need to respond to market pressures, lack of demand for large auditors and collusion incentives. The empirical results show that since the reform in China, companies with more non-tradable shares and decreased state ownership are more likely to choose Big 10. Besides, central state-owned enterprises are more likely to hire Big 10. However, companies with politically-connected CEOs are less likely to hire Big 10.
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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